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INTRODUCTION 
ith President Barack Obama in the White House and former 
Senator Hillary Clinton appointed as Secretary of State, the 
administration has begun to address the “unfinished business”1 
remaining after President Clinton’s presidency concerning Holocaust-
era restitution.2  The U.S. State Department’s Special Envoy for 
Holocaust Issues, Ambassador J. Christian Kennedy, has held a series 
of meetings at the State Department in relation to the 2009 diplomatic 
conference, which was held in Prague, about looted art and 
immovable property never restituted after World War II.3  Secretary 
Clinton appointed Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat to head the U.S. 
delegation to the conference, which the State Department regarded as 
“the most important opportunity of the decade to address the wrongs 
committed during the Nazi era.”4  The declaration that resulted from 
the conference, known as the “Terezin Declaration,” was limited to 
 
1 See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, 
AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2003) (coining the term “unfinished 
business”). 
2 E.g., id. at 68–70 (providing a history of diplomatic negotiations during the Clinton 
administration). 
3 Preparations for Holocaust Era Assets Conference-Looted Art & Immovable Property, 
74 Fed. Reg. 7533-02 (Feb. 17, 2009); Press Release, Museum Security Group, 
International Conference “Holocaust Era Assets,” June 26–30 2009, Terezín, Prague (Mar. 
29, 2009) (on file with author). 
4 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary Clinton Appoints Stuart E. Eizenstat as 
Head of U.S. Delegation to the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conferences, June 26–30, 
2009 (May 19, 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123653.htm. 
W 
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encouraging participating nations to engage in “intensified systematic 
provenance research” and to attempt to “facilitate just and fair 
solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art” within their 
legal systems.5  The Terezin Declaration is very similar to the 1998 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, and both 
are non-binding.6  Significantly, the Terezin Declaration specifically 
calls upon both governmental and private actors to resolve cases “on 
the facts and merits,” as opposed to legal technicalities.7  Perhaps the 
most noteworthy development at the conference was not included in 
the declaration itself, but rather announced by Ambassador Eizenstat: 
the possible creation of a formal U.S. body to assist claimants and 
present owners of potentially looted works, which could be modeled 
after the United Kingdom’s Spoliation Advisory Commission.8 
Previously classified archives, which were opened in recent years, 
have revealed the inadequacy of post-war restitution, and, as a result, 
an increasing number of claims have been filed in U.S. courts by heirs 
of Jews whose art and other assets were subject to theft, forced sales, 
infamous “Jew auctions,” and Aryanizations.9  Many of the claimants, 
present-day possessors, and artworks themselves are located in the 
United States.10  These claims demonstrate one tragic sliver of the 
 
5 PRAGUE HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE: TEREZIN DECLARATION (2009), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm. 
6 Id.; U.S. STATE DEP’T, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, in 
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS PROCEEDINGS 971, 971 (1998) 
[hereinafter Washington Principles], available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ 
holocaust/heacappen.pdf (non-binding statement signed by forty-four governments 
encouraging nations to resolve claims without litigation). 
7 PRAGUE HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE: TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 
5. 
8 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Prague Holocaust Era Assets 
Conference, Open Plenary Session Remarks at Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference 
(June 28, 2009), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/126158.htm (“I believe that the 
U.S. should work with all interested stakeholders, including museums, auction houses, 
dealers, attorneys, art experts, and Holocaust survivors, in creating formal group [sic] to 
provide assistance to claimants and current holders of artworks in determining their proper 
ownership.  The new UK spoliation advisory commission can serve as a model.”); 
Catherine Hickley, Eizenstat Favors U.S. Nazi Loot Panel to Advise on Disputed Art (June 
28, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=aB_A3zMb02Ko. 
9 E.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need 
for Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes: Creation of an International Tribunal, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 155, 155 n.1 (2007) [hereinafter Kreder, Tribunal] (providing extensive 
list of cases); see also von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-
56691, 2009 WL 2516336 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2009). 
10 See generally Janice Arnold, Seventh Stern Painting Restored to Estate, CANADIAN 
JEWISH NEWS, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.cjnews.com/index.php?option= 
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victimization of Jews during the Holocaust era: the systematic 
targeting of prominent Jews to steal vast numbers of high-value 
artworks, often to sell in neutral Switzerland for foreign currency.11 
Because museums, as non-profit institutions, should benefit society 
and are commonly said to hold objects in trust for the public,12 
deaccessioning an object—removing it from a museum’s collection—
“must only be undertaken with a full understanding of the 
significance of the item, its character (whether renewable or non-
renewable), legal standing, and any loss of public trust that might 
result from such action.”13  Fiduciary obligations arise under state 
statutory law, common law, or both and, at least in a theoretical sense, 
these obligations also arise as a consequence of seeking not-for-profit 
corporate status and tax treatment.14  Further, ethics codes are 
voluntarily accepted by museums when they seek membership in 
various organizations, such as the Association of Art Museum 
 
com_content&task=view&id=16868&Itemid=86; Associated Press, U.S. Recovers 
Painting Stolen by Nazis, Apr. 20, 2009, available at http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/ 
090420_US_Recovers_Painting_Stolen_by_Nazis; Steve Chawkins, Hearst Castle to Give 
Up Nazi Loot, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at 6; Italian Painting Stolen by Nazis Recovered, 
CANADIAN PRESS, May 6, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
nationworld/2009185822_apusnaziart.html; Grosz Heirs File Suit Against MoMA for 
Artworks Unlawfully Taken During Nazi Era, MMD NEWSWIRE, Apr. 13, 2009, 
http://www.mmdnewswire.com/grosz-heirs-art-4904.html; News Release, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Returns Painting Stolen During Holocaust 
(Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0904/090421newyork.htm. 
11 See, e.g., HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO 
STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 184–89 (1997).  For more recent works 
analyzing Nazi plunder, see GÖTZ ALY, HITLER’S BENEFICIARIES: PLUNDER, RACIAL 
WAR, AND THE NAZI WELFARE STATE (Jefferson Chase trans., Metro Books 2005); 
MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS: THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE 
HOLOCAUST, 1933–1945 (2008); RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD REICH IN POWER, 1933–
1939, at 322–411 (2005). 
12 E.g., ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE ON 
THE SPOLIATION OF ART DURING THE NAZI/WORLD WAR II ERA (1933–1934) (1998) 
[hereinafter AAMD GUIDELINES], available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php 
(“AAMD has developed the following guidelines to assist museums in resolving claims, 
reconciling the interests of individuals who were dispossessed of works of art or their heirs 
together with the fiduciary and legal obligations and responsibilities of art museums and 
their trustees to the public for whom they hold works of art in trust.”); Patty Gerstenblith, 
Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of 
Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409 (2003); see also Verified 
Complaint ¶¶ 165–168, Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, No. 09 Civ. 3706 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 10, 2009). 
13 INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS § 2.13 (2006), 
http://icom.museum/ethics.html [hereinafter ICOM PRINCIPLES]. 
14 E.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 416–17. 
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Directors (AAMD), the American Association of Museums (AAM), 
or the International Council of Museums (ICOM).15  Museums also 
self-regulate by adopting their own bylaws.16 
By the end of 1998, it appeared that the art community was 
beginning to adopt the idea that statutes of limitations should not bar 
an otherwise valid claim.17  Forty-four nations, including the United 
States, signed the aforementioned Washington Conference Principles 
on Nazi-Confiscated Art in December 1998 (Washington 
Principles),18 which, although not binding, “called on museums, 
governments, commercial galleries, and auction houses to cooperate 
in tracing looted art through more stringent research into the 
provenance of every item” and “provide[d] international attention and 
legitimacy to the return of [Nazi-looted] art.”19  The AAMD and the 
AAM have parallel guidelines, which provide that museums should 
strive to conduct provenance research to identify and publicize 
objects with questionable ownership histories.20  Both encourage the 
use of mediation, and the AAM Guidelines expressly state that 
museums “may elect to waive certain available defenses” to resolve 
claims on the merits.21  Settlement of such claims is in accordance 
with, but not commanded by, these museum guidelines and the 
 
15 Id. at 424. 
16 Id. 
17 Many writers maintain that moral considerations should trump legal defenses in 
displaced art cases.  E.g., Daniel Range, Deaccessioning and Its Costs in the Holocaust Art 
Context: The United States and Great Britain, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 655, 665–66 (2004) 
(“‘[T]o truly assist claimants in recovering their art objects, the discussion needs to be 
taken out of an exclusively legal context and elevated to a moral and political level.’” 
(quoting Monica Dugot, The Holocaust Claims Processing Office’s Handling of Art 
Claims, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 133, 137 (2001))); see also Emily J. Henson, Comment, 
The Last Prisoners of War: Returning World War II Art to Its Rightful Owners—Can 
Moral Obligations Be Translated into Legal Duties?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103 (2002); 
Julia Parker, Note, World War II & Heirless Art: Unleashing the Final Prisoners of War, 
13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661 (2005). 
18 Washington Principles, supra note 6, at 971.  The nations reaffirmed the Washington 
Principles in Vilnius, Lithuania in 2000.  Vilnius Forum Declaration, Commission for 
Looted Art in Europe (Oct. 5, 2000), available at http://www.lootedartcommission 
.com/vilnius-forum. 
19 EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 198–99. 
20 AM. ASS’N OF MUSEUMS, GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL 
APPROPRIATION OF OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA, §§ 1–3 (amended Apr. 2001) 
[hereinafter AAM GUIDELINES], available at http://aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/ 
nazi_guidelines.cfm; AAMD GUIDELINES, supra note 12, ¶ II.A.1. 
21 AAM GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 4(f).  The guidelines provide, in part, that 
museums should investigate their collections and facilitate access to information about any 
works that seem to have gaps in provenance related to World War II.  Id. § 3. 
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Washington Principles, which call for nations to reach “just and fair” 
solutions.22  Such solutions “may vary according to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding [each] case,”23 but the guidelines give no 
further direction as to what is “just and fair” in the difficult cases 
where the evidence is not 100% clear.24 
Despite the international pronouncement to reach “just and fair” 
solutions and the leeway authorized to waive defenses, there is often 
significant opposition to restituting art from museum collections.25 
Quite recently, Sir Norman Rosenthal, the child of Jewish refugees 
from Nazi-occupied Europe and former Exhibitions Secretary of the 
British Royal Academy of Arts, criticized the current restitution 
movement, asserting that no more art displaced during the Nazi era 
should be returned.26  He stated: “If valuable objects have ended up in 
 
22 Washington Principles, supra note 6, ¶ 8, at 971 (“If the pre-War owners of art that is 
found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted, or their heirs, 
can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, 
recognizing this may vary according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific 
case.”). 
23 Id. 
24 When speaking to the delegates at the Washington Conference, esteemed diplomat 
and Holocaust scholar Stuart Eizenstat stated: “We can begin by recognizing this as a 
moral matter—we should not apply the ordinary rules designed for commercial 
transactions of societies that operate under the rule of law to people whose property and 
very lives were taken by one of the most profoundly illegal regimes the world has ever 
known.”  Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec’y for Econ. & Bus. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, In 
Support of Principles of Nazi-Confiscated Art, Presentation at the Washington Conference 
on Holocaust-Era Assets (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/ 
1998/981203_eizenstat_heac_art.html. 
25 Tony Paterson & David Cox, German Crisis Meeting Called on Nazi Art Sales, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 12, 2006, at 28, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1533955/German-crisis-meeting-called-on-
Nazi-art-sales.html (describing German museum community’s publicly stated fears that its 
heritage is being “spirited away from public view and sold off for millions to private 
collectors” at the expense of the public’s right to view the work); see also Alexander Pulte, 
German Angst over Return of Kirchner Painting, IFAR J., 2007, at 11; Michael 
Kimmelman, Klimts Go to Market; Museums Hold Their Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2006, at E1; Stevenson Swanson, It’s ‘Our Mona Lisa,’ CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2006, at 1; 
Matthias Weller, About Nazi-Confiscated Art: The Return of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s 
Berliner Strabenszene—A Case Study, KUNSTRSP 2007, Feb. 2007, at 51, available at 
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2007/2/weller/htm; Catherine Hickley, Culture 
Minister Urges Munich to Review Return of Looted Klee, BLOOMBERG, May 18, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=adg1y5luyMdQ&refer=muse 
(discussing the mayor of Munich’s denial of a claim because the painting in question was 
stolen for a Nazi exhibition of “degenerate art,” which, he argued, precludes the painting 
from falling within the international guidelines for the restitution of art). 
26 Sir Norman Rosenthal, Editorial, The Time Has Come for a Statute of Limitations, 
ART NEWSPAPER, Dec. 2008, at 30, 30, available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/ 
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the public sphere, even on account of the terrible facts of history, then 
that is the way it is.”27  His basic philosophy is that, because those 
who lost art collections generally were wealthy, they are not entitled 
to restitution today as “[t]he vast majority of individuals, who were 
beaten up or killed during the Nazi period—or indeed by other 
oppressors in different parts of Europe—did not have art treasures 
that their children and grandchildren can now claim as 
compensation.”28  He cynically characterized the current movement 
as being premised on a “market-driven hypocrisy” and asserted that 
“it is well known that lawyers and auction houses are trying to drum 
up trade in this way.”29  In conclusion, he stated: 
 There should now surely be a statute of limitations on this kind 
of restitution.  If we were still in 1950 and the people who owned 
the Manet or the Monet were still alive, then it would surely be 
correct to give these paintings back, but not now and not to 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren.  The world should let go of 
the past and live in the present.  Of course, the best of the past needs 
to be looked after, but we should not be overly obsessive about the 
worst of the past—it is not useful either to individuals or society as 
a whole.  Each person should invent him or herself creatively in the 
present, and not on the back of the lost wealth of ancestors.30 
Sir Rosenthal’s view ignores the significance of history, discussed 
in Part I below, and opens the door for other unsubstantiated criticism 
of the claimants.31  “The claimant’s initial decision to make a claim—
 
article.asp?id=16627; see also Ulrike Knöfel, A Question of Morality: An End to 
Restitution of Nazi Looted Art?, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/germany/0,1518,618400,00.html (discussing Norman Rosenthal’s opposition 
to restitution); SPIEGEL Interview with British Art Expert: “We Must Live in the 
Present,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ 
0,1518,618399,00.html (interviewing Norman Rosenthal regarding his controversial 
opposition to the return of art stolen by the Nazis).  But see Catherine Hickley, Germany 
Rejects Call for End to Restitution of Nazi-Looted Art, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 9, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=aQDSmUKhn7XU (quoting 
German Culture Minister Bernd Neumann’s statement that the German government 
remains committed to restitution despite Norman Rosenthal’s Der Spiegel interview). 
27 Rosenthal, supra note 26, at 30. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  Similar arguments have been made in regard to reparations for other historical 
wrongs.  E.g., Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009) (American Indian land claims). 
31 Jonathan Jones, Norman Rosenthal Is Right About Looted Art, http://www 
.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2009/jan/09/looted-art-norman-rosenthal/ 
(Jan. 9, 2009, 14:36 GMT) (stating that “nothing in today’s art world is more absurd and 
insidiously destructive” than restitution of art displaced during the Nazi era) (Jones is the 
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whether to pursue restitution of a material object—is usually based on 
deep emotion,” not simply—and often not at all—on the desire for 
financial gain.32  Some promised their parents or grandparents that 
they would pursue recovery with such vigor that “it becomes an 
almost sacred duty.”33  In fact, many claimants 
believe they owe it to the memory of their family to pursue a 
measure of justice, and that the recovery of property, particularly 
that which demonstrates the education and taste of their forebears, 
allows present and future generations to connect to an ancestral 
world that was disrupted and destroyed by Hitler.34 
Adam Zamoyski, an heir to the Czartoryska-Dzialynska Collection 
located at Goluchów Castle in Poland, replied to Sir Rosenthal’s 
comments as follows: 
 Many direct victims of Nazi looting tried to reclaim their 
property in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  But they came up 
against a wall of dishonesty and contempt on the part of collectors, 
auction houses, museum curators and dealers, who ducked and 
delayed in the hope that the problem would go away. 
 In many cases, that is still their attitude, and the reason claims 
are still being brought.  If justice had been done then, there would 
be no cause for revindication now.  Nor is it entirely fair to say, as 
he does, that the claimants are all rich people: many are living in 
very humble circumstances—and most claims are not made for 
reasons of material benefit. 
 . . . . 
 The material advantage to us [the Zamoyski family] would be 
negligible.  The winners would be the art world and the public; the 
only losers would be the vaults of museums throughout Europe and 
a few dealers and collectors who know they are in possession of 
 
art critic for the Guardian newspaper in London); see also Robin Cembalest, Inconvenient 
Truths: The Trouble with Placing Time Limits on War-Loot Claims, ART NEWS, Mar. 
2009, at 60, available at http://artnews.com/issues/article.asp?art_id=2640 (criticizing 
Norman Rosenthal’s call to end restitution as ignoring the “stonewalling, obfuscation, and 
legal obstacles” faced during initial efforts to determine the history of supposedly 
“heirless” art); Jeffrey Goldberg, Holocaust Art and the Statute of Limitations, 
http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/02/holocaust_art.php (Feb. 23, 2009, 
11:22 EST). 
32 Constance Lowenthal, Recovering Looted Jewish Cultural Property, in RESOLUTION 
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 139, 139 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ed., 2004). 
33 Id. at 139–40. 
34 Id. at 139; accord Daniel Shapiro, Repatriation: A Modest Proposal, 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 95, 105 (1998) (“[R]epatriation claims ultimately come down to emotions 
and beliefs–not things.”). 
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stolen goods and cannot respectably sell them, or even show 
them.35 
Several members of the House of Lords responded to Sir Rosenthal 
as follows: 
“The public interest must surely be in upholding the rule of law, 
rather than promoting an international free-for-all through the 
unrestricted circulation of tainted works of art.  Do we really wish 
to educate our children to have no respect for history, legality and 
ethical values by providing museums with the opportunity freely to 
exhibit stolen property?”36 
The truth is that the public and some innocents will be forced to 
give up art, but justice and public trust in the sanctity of museums 
command restitution of looted art.37  Until virtually all relevant 
research is publicly available at very low or no cost, a statute of 
limitations would block some claims before the claimants are even 
aware of infringement on their rights and the correct entity to sue.38  
Following such a course would give incentive to a new generation of 
possessors of looted art to sit back and wait until more claimants die 
off before attempting to show or sell the art at issue. 
Failure of certain museums and collectors to perform more of the 
costly provenance research and restitute those objects that were 
forcibly taken means the public will unwittingly benefit from the 
horrendous crimes of the Holocaust, which is akin to “building on top 
of Auschwitz.”39  But the museums need a significant amount of 
 
35 Adam Zamoyski, Editorial, Restitution Will Benefit the Public More Than the Heirs, 
THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 9, 2009, at 10, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
opinion/commentators/adam-zamoyski-restitution-will-benefit-the-public-more-than-the-
heirs-1242589.html. 
36 See Stolen Art Works, TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 28, 2006, at 18. 
37 See AAM GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at general princs. (“AAM, AAM/ICOM, and 
the American museum community are committed to continually identifying and achieving 
the highest standard of legal and ethical collections stewardship practices.  The AAM 
Code of Ethics for Museums states that the ‘stewardship of collections entails the highest 
public trust and carries with it the presumption of rightful ownership, permanence, care, 
documentation, accessibility, and responsible disposal.’”). 
38 Leon Symons, No Time Limit for Art Claims, JEWISH CHRON. (London), Dec. 18, 
2008, at 3, available at http://www.thejc.com/articles/no-time-limit-art-claims; see also 
Lawrence M. Kaye, Cultural Property Theft During War: Application of the Statute of 
Limitations, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 217, 222 (Martine 
Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1996) (arguing that statutes of limitations should not 
apply to the “plunder of cultural property” because it is a war crime). 
39 See generally Peter Mostow, “Like Building on Top of Auschwitz”: On the Symbolic 
Meaning of Using Data from the Nazi Experiments, and on Non-Use as a Form of 
Memorial, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 403, 404, 411 (1993–1994) (discussing the symbolic 
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money to finance the research.  During a recent two-day conference 
held in Berlin to mark the tenth anniversary of the Washington 
Principles entitled “Taking Responsibility,” the German Federal 
Commissioner for Culture, Bernd Neumann, both announced that the 
German government had rejected calls from some museums fearing a 
“rush to get items back” to impose deadlines and discussed how some 
German museums and collections had been dragging their heels on 
provenance research.40  Moreover, Hermann Parzinger, officiator of 
the conference and new president of the Prussian Cultural Heritage 
Foundation (Stiftung Preussicher Kulturbesitz), made a very 
significant and new point in the restitution debate—that the German 
government has taken an official position that post-war compensation 
to claimants for art that could not be located did not block a 
claimant’s potential restitution claim today, although the 
compensation would need to be returned.41 
The current wave of claims in Germany and the United States is 
testing the limits of the aforementioned principles and guidelines.  
What level of evidence of Nazi-era looting and failure of post-war 
restitution should convince a museum simply to turn art over to a 
claimant?  Who should bear the burden of establishing title?  Should a 
respectable museum ever use a technicality like the statute of 
limitations or good faith purchaser defenses under Swiss law to defeat 
a Nazi-era claim?  Does asserting a time-bar defense against a claim 
perceived to be weak preclude historical honesty and justice, or does 
it reflect proper stewardship of museum collections, which are held in 
trust for the public? 
In contrast to the optimistic hopes in 1998 to settle all claims 
expressed, we have seen a new trend emerge whereby current 
possessors of art displaced during the Holocaust, including museums, 
have been the first to file suit to quiet title, raising technical 
defenses.42  This Article will explore this recent trend, the reasons for 
it, and the consequences resulting from it.  Part I will provide lesser-
known historical background missing from the mainstream legal 
literature.  Parts II through VI will lay out the reasons for and 
 
implications of refusing to utilize data collected in Nazis’ cruel pseudo-medical 
experiments in concentration camps). 
40 Symons, supra note 38, at 3. 
41 Marilyn Henry, Editorial, Metro Views: Digging Out the Provenance, JERUSALEM 
POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at 15, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/ 
Satellite?cid=1229868834494&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
42 See infra Part V. 
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progression of the restitution and declaratory judgment movement in 
Nazi-era art cases.  Part VII discusses the consequences of the 
movement and offers best practices for the future for both claimants 
and present-day possessors. 
I 
LESSER-KNOWN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ABOUT THE ART 
MARKET DURING THE NAZI ERA 
Claims to art displaced during the Nazi era by definition involve 
more than sixty years of history and evidence.  It is necessary to 
employ archival researchers to prove that the art claimed is the same 
as that which had been possessed by the claimant, or the claimant’s 
predecessor, and that the art claimed was both actually looted or 
subjected to a forced sale and never restituted after the war.43  
Moreover, many pieces were laundered through Switzerland into the 
international art market, implicating the laws of multiple 
jurisdictions.44  Foreign legal experts must be employed to explain the 
applicable historical legal doctrine.45  Sovereign immunity may also 
be an issue.46  These cases are extremely expensive to litigate because 
of the need to demonstrate to judges how legal doctrines should be 
 
43 E.g., Henry, supra note 41, at 15 (indicating that most of the onus currently falls on 
claimants to conduct this research because of inadequate museum provenance research).  
For additional information about Nazi-era provenance research, see generally NANCY H. 
YEIDE ET AL., THE AAM GUIDE TO PROVENANCE RESEARCH (2001). 
44 E.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP), 2008 WL 4067335, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 2, 2008) (performing choice-of-law/conflicts analysis and applying Swiss law). 
45 In 1998, the overwhelming consensus appeared to be that the injustice perpetuated 
through the market trafficking of Nazi-looted art must be undone–even if the present-day 
possessors of such art truly were innocent, bona fide purchasers for value.  That consensus, 
however, is a fragile one, with a fundamental crack in the foundation as to whether bona 
fide purchasers for value should be compensated.  Under U.S. law, bona fide purchasers 
have absolutely no right to compensation, whereas, under civil law, they do.  See generally 
Brief for Bernard Beliak et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Counter-Claimant-
Appellants, Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 08-5119-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing choice-
of-law/conflicts analysis); Brief for Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien (Jewish 
Community Vienna) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 
08-5119-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2009) (analyzing Swiss law). 
46 See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700–02 (2004) (holding that the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act authorized exercising jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in a 
modern-day suit for failure to restitute Klimt masterpieces after World War II); Cassirer v. 
Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (resolving sovereign immunity issues); see 
also Sue Choi, Comment, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167 (2005) (discussing 
sovereign immunity). 
 48 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 37 
interpreted in light of the intricate history.47  However, because of the 
value of some of the art, the potential financial benefit may be worth 
the risk. 
The vastness of art looting by Nazis has been well documented and 
will not be repeated in full here, but a few key historical facts, 
particularly lesser-known facts, must be noted to understand recent 
and currently pending litigation.48  It must not be forgotten that one 
core part of the Nazis’ “Final Solution” was the destruction of Jewish 
culture and the targeted pillaging of its art.49  The Nazis maintained 
“that Jews had intentionally duped the German people into embracing 
nontraditional aesthetic styles” and “that they had promoted modern 
art as a ploy to reap huge profits.”50  Hitler, the failed artist, sought to 
eliminate Jewish culture from the Third Reich, including modern art, 
which he deemed “degenerate.”51  The Nazi regime targeted such art 
to destroy it, trade it for other works, or sell it, often through Swiss 
dealers, to raise foreign currency.52  The Nazis, incredibly in 
retrospect, documented much of their theft and persecution.53 
On April 26, 1938, “the Nazis passed a law requiring Jews within 
the Nazi Reich (including Austria) with more than 5,000 Reichmarks 
(‘RM’) in property to periodically declare and inventory assets, 
 
47 See infra Part VII. 
48 For widely accepted histories of Nazi looting and its impact on the international art 
market, see FELICIANO, supra note 11, at 184–89; PETER HARCLERODE & BRENDAN 
PITTAWAY, WORLD WAR II AND THE LOST MASTERS: THE LOOTING OF EUROPE’S 
TREASUREHOUSES (1999); MICHAEL J. KURTZ, AMERICA AND THE RETURN OF NAZI 
CONTRABAND: THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE’S CULTURAL TREASURES 15 (2006); LYNN H. 
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD 
REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994); NORMAN PALMER, MUSEUMS AND THE 
HOLOCAUST: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 6–8 (2000); JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, 
ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH 54 (1996) [hereinafter PETROPOULOS, ART AS 
POLITICS]; JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, THE FAUSTIAN BARGAIN: THE ART WORLD IN 
NAZI GERMANY (2000) [hereinafter PETROPOULOS, FAUSTIAN BARGAIN]. 
49 KURTZ, supra note 48, at 15.  See generally FELICIANO, supra note 11, at 185. 
50 PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS, supra note 48, at 54. 
51 KURTZ, supra note 48, at 13 (citing PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS, supra note 48, 
at 7); see also Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 201(4), 112 Stat. 15, 
17 (1998) (“The Nazis’ policy of looting art was a critical element and incentive in their 
campaign of genocide against individuals of Jewish and other religious and cultural 
heritage . . . .”); PALMER, supra note 48, at 8. 
52 See PALMER, supra note 48, at 7–9; PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS, supra note 48, 
at 60–61. 
53 Brief for Bernard Beliak et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Counter-
Claimant-Appellants, supra note 45, at 6; see also ALY, supra note 11, at 136; WILLIAM 
L. SHIRER, 20TH CENTURY JOURNEY: THE NIGHTMARE YEARS, 1930–1940, at 30 (1984). 
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including art collections.”54  After registration, property “could not be 
sold without notice to the Nazi Property Control Office.”55  “Nazis 
systematically expropriated Jewish property by putting one spouse in 
a concentration camp and forcing the remaining spouse to liquidate 
remaining assets by a power of attorney.”56  Interestingly, the Nazis 
were particular about documenting their thefts to “insure [their] 
‘legality’ under the Nuremburg and pre-War laws” in an effort “to 
make involuntary transactions appear ordinary and legal, such as by 
allowing payment for seized assets—but into blocked accounts.”57 
Much art was Aryanized,58 or subjected to forced sales for prices 
significantly below market value (if any value ever actually 
materialized for the seller),59 and some art was sold at infamous “Jew 
auctions,” which are now universally recognized as illegal.60  But 
some sales before April 26, 1938, were legitimate and for fair market 
value or close thereto.61  Some people were able to voluntarily sell art 
on the open market, albeit not much modern art after Hitler declared it 
“degenerate”.62  Additionally, because so many Jews were compelled 
 
54 Appellant Brief at 7, Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 08-5119-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2009); see 
also ALY, supra note 11, at 42; HAROLD JAMES, THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI 
ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 51 (2001). 
55 Appellant Brief, supra note 54, at 7. 
56 Id. 
57 Brief for Bernard Beliak et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Counter-
Claimant-Appellants, supra note 45, at 6. 
58 Property that was owned by Jews was “Aryanized” when the Nazi regime either 
forced the Jewish owners to sell it to an Aryan—as defined under Nazi law—or 
confiscated the property from the Jewish owner and gave it to an Aryan.  See THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 672 (2d ed. 1989); Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in 
America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 107 
n.441 (2000). 
59 See, e.g., Douglas C. McGill, Met Painting Traced to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 
1987, at C19. 
60 See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 48, at 17. 
61 Id. at 59–60; Judy Dempsey, Germany Tracing Artwork and Its Nazi Past, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/ 
world/europe/22iht-letter.4.18871861.html (“‘There is the issue of enforced transactions of 
every sale of every Jewish collection that happened during the Nazi times,’ said [Sean] 
Rainbird, a former curator of the Tate Modern in London.  ‘There were cases where 
individuals were allowed to take their collections out of the country, and there were some 
dealers, in a gesture of solidarity, who helped them and were dealing with them in an 
honest way.[’]”).  See generally PETROPOULOS, FAUSTIAN BARGAIN, supra note 48. 
62 PALMER, supra note 48, at 59–60; see also Adam Zagorin, Saving the Spoils of War, 
TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 87 (discussing opposition to compensating claimants for works sold 
in the 1930s at what seemed to have been fair prices in that market and noting that the art 
market in New York “continued to function even as fighting raged in Europe”). 
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to forfeit “flight asset[s]”63 to pay for their passage out of the Reich, 
the European art market reflected depressed prices.64 
Sorting the legitimate transaction from the illegitimate sixty or 
seventy years later can be extremely difficult.  Post-war restitution 
legislation presumed that all sales and transfers of property from a 
Jew to a non-Jew after the enactment of the Nuremberg laws in 1935 
were forced sales unless certain conditions were satisfied, most 
commonly that the purchaser, or subsequent good faith purchaser, had 
to demonstrate that the sale was for fair market value.65  Under these 
laws, acts taken to liquidate a spouse’s property pursuant to forcibly 
induced powers of attorney also would be void if challenged.66 
Switzerland has played a major role in the laundering of looted 
art—although it recently changed its laws.67  In 1943, the Allies 
issued a warning, known as the “London Declaration,”68 to 
Switzerland against laundering property out of Nazi-controlled 
territory, which stated the following: 
 
63 See, e.g., Andrew Adler, Expanding the Scope of Museums’ Ethical Guidelines with 
Respect to Nazi-Looted Art: Incorporating Restitution Claims Based on Private Sales 
Made as a Direct Result of Persecution, 14 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 57, 65 (2007). 
64 See Zagorin, supra note 62, at 87 (“‘The paintings came to America because for more 
than 10 years during and after the war there was no place else to sell them . . . .’” (quoting 
Willi Korte, a consultant on Holocaust losses to the Senate Banking Committee )). 
65 Karen Heilig, From the Luxembourg Agreement to Today: Representing a People, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 176, 188 n.69 (2002) (citing German Gesetz zur Regelung offener 
Vermögensfragen, v.28.9.1990 (BGB1. II S. 889, 1159), §1, ¶ 6); see also Ardelia R. Hall, 
The Recovery of Cultural Objects Dispersed During World War II, 25 DEP’T ST. BULL. 
337 (1951) (discussing post-war laws). 
66 See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 48, 119–23; see also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. 
Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that Military Government Law 
59 superseded German law and “rendered void any transfer of cultural property”); United 
States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting By Egon Schiele, No. 99 Civ. 9940(MBM), 2002 
WL 553532, at *20 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (“an Austrian law enacted in 1946 
declared coerced transfers absolutely void”). 
67 E.g., Michele Kunitz, Comment, Switzerland & the International Trade in Art & 
Antiquities, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 519, 520 (2001); see also Brief for Israelitische 
Kultusgemeinde Wien (Jewish Community Vienna) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Reversal, supra note 45, at 6–15 (clarifying Swiss law); Marc-André Renold, An 
Important Swiss Decision Relating to the International Transfer of Cultural Goods: The 
Swiss Supreme Court’s Decision on the Giant Antique Mogul Gold Coins, 13 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 361 (2006) (regarding recent change in Swiss law). 
68 Ursula Kriebaum, Restitution Claims for Massive Violations of Human Rights During 
the Nazi Regime: The Austrian Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK 
2001, REPARATIONS: REDRESSING PAST WRONGS 165, 172–73 (George Ulrich & Louise 
Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003). 
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[The Allies] “[h]ereby issue a formal warning to all concerned, and 
in particular to persons in neutral countries, that they intend to do 
their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the 
governments with which they are at war against the countries and 
peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled. 
 Accordingly the governments making this declaration and the 
French National Committee reserve all their rights to declare invalid 
any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and interests of 
any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in the 
territories which have come under the occupation or control, direct 
or indirect, of the governments with which they are at war or which 
belong or have belonged, to persons, including juridical persons, 
resident in such territories.  This warning applies whether such 
transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, 
or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport 
to be voluntarily effected.” 69 
Following the London Declaration, Switzerland issued warnings to 
Swiss art dealers that transactions in property from Nazi-occupied 
territories had no presumption of good faith acquisition.70  The 
warnings were not rescinded, and the dealers remained on notice that 
diligence in investigating provenance of property from Nazi-occupied 
Austria remained in effect through the 1950s.71 
Claims by heirs of Austrian Jews are essential to the new wave of 
Nazi-era art claims.  The extent of victimization of Austrian Jews did 
not receive the same attention, immediately after World War II, as the 
victimization of Jews in other European countries because, at that 
time, Austria was still viewed as “the first free country to fall a victim 
to Hitlerite aggression.”72  The historical record of occupied and 
neutral nations’ complicity with the Nazi regime has been newly 
examined, and significant, previously classified evidence has been 
 
69 U.S. Dep’t of State, Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-
Controlled Territory (Jan. 5, 1943), in 8 DEP’T ST. BULL. 21, 21–22 (1943). 
70 Appellant Brief, supra note 54, at 12. 
71 Id.; see also Milton Esterow, Europe Is Still Hunting its Plundered Art, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 1964, at 1; Dr. Gottfried Weiss, Summary of Address Delivered at the University 
of Zurich 3 (July 15, 1945) (transcript available at the National Archives and Records 
Administration in College Park, Maryland). 
72 U.S. Dep’t of State, The Triparte Conference in Moscow (Nov. 1, 1943) in 9 DEP’T 
ST. BULL. 307, 310 (1943).  (The Moscow Declaration, signed by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, included the “Declaration on Austria,” which 
characterized the 1938 Anschluss (annexation) of Austria in this way.).  This view of the 
Anschluss has been all but uniformly discredited.  See, e.g., Hannah Lessing & Fiorentina 
Azizi, Austria Confronts Her Past, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 226, 230–31 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 
2006). 
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revealed.73  Most of the nonart cases premised on the newly available 
historical evidence have since been resolved en masse to achieve 
“rough justice,”74 but mass dispute resolution for Nazi-era stolen art 
claims has been impossible to achieve thus far.75  As a result, 
claimants and present-day possessors of stolen art are forced to 
wrestle with each claim to each tainted piece of art individually—and 
expensively and emotionally.76 
II 
THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN NAZI-ERA ART RESTITUTION 
MOVEMENT 
The first modern Nazi-looted art case officially began on January 
7, 1998, when the New York County District Attorney’s office, as 
part of a criminal investigation, served a grand jury subpoena on the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York for the painting Portrait of 
Wally by Egon Schiele.77  Subsequently, the United States 
commenced civil forfeiture proceedings against the painting under the 
National Stolen Property Act.78  Although criticized on many grounds 
by many commentators, including by this author,79 it cannot be 
denied that the federal case highlighted the extreme inadequacy of 
Austrian post-war restitution efforts and launched the modern wave of 
Holocaust-art restitution claims.80 
 
73 See generally, e.g., Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has “The Lost Museum” 
Been Found? Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets 
Offer Real Opportunity to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-Looted 
Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115 (2002). 
74 See EIZENSTAT, supra note 1, at 353.  See generally Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH 
& Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2005) (class action concerning Austrian Nazi-era conduct 
not constituting art theft). 
75 E.g., Kreder, Tribunal, supra note 9, at 184. 
76 E.g., Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (holding that the Republic of Austria 
was subject to jurisdiction in the United States for its expropriation of Gustav Klimt 
paintings from an Austrian family and noting $135,000 filing fee to seek justice in 
Austrian courts). 
77 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719 
N.E.2d 897, 898–99 (N.Y. 1999). 
78 United States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, No. 99 Civ. 
9940(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002). 
79 See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Remedies in 
Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1199 (2005). 
80 For an extensive sample of post-2000 claims, see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The 
Holocaust, Museum Ethics and Legalism, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 2 n.2 (2008). 
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In 1997, the Leopold Museum-Privatstiftung (“Leopold”) lent 
Portrait of Wally to the New York Museum of Modern Art for 
exhibition.81  By this time, the painting was valued at over $2 
million.82  Three days after the exhibition ended, the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office served the subpoena for the 
painting, but it was quashed because a New York anti-seizure statute 
for works exhibited by nonresidents, such as the Leopold, prohibited 
the painting’s seizure at the state level.83  However, a U.S. magistrate 
judge issued a warrant to seize the painting under federal law a few 
hours later, and the federal government began the civil forfeiture 
proceedings.84  The judge issued the warrant based on a finding of 
probable cause that the Leopold had violated the National Stolen 
Property Act, a federal law, by transporting the painting in foreign 
commerce while knowing that it was stolen property.85 
In response to continued criticism that Austria had failed to 
adequately restitute Nazi-looted art and compensate Holocaust 
victims after the war,86 the Austrian government enacted legislation 
in 1995 giving the Austrian Jewish community ownership of 
“heirless” art looted by Nazis, which had been simply sitting in 
 
81 Portrait of Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *4. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of 
Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1999)).  The New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law 
prohibited seizure of any work of fine art on loan to any museum or other non-profit 
exhibitor of art in the state of New York. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 
(McKinney Supp. 2009).  At the time, the law provided in full: 
No process of attachment, execution, sequestration, replevin, distress or any kind 
of seizure shall be served or levied upon any work of fine art while the same is 
enroute to or from, or while on exhibition or deposited by a nonresident exhibitor 
at any exhibition held under the auspices or supervision of any museum, college, 
university or other nonprofit art gallery, institution or organization within any 
city or county of this state for any cultural, educational, charitable or other 
purpose not conducted for profit to the exhibitor, nor shall such work of fine art 
be subject to attachment, seizure, levy or sale, for any cause whatever in the 
hands of the authorities of such exhibition or otherwise. 
Id.  After Portrait of Wally was decided, the New York legislature eliminated the 
protection against seizure in criminal forfeiture proceedings, at least temporarily.  See 
Collins, supra note 73, at 139.  The amendment eliminating the protection against criminal 
forfeiture proceedings, as it was written, was “deemed repealed on June 1, 2002.” § 12.03.  
Research indicates that the amendment expired quietly on that date. 
84 Portrait of Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *4. 
85 See id. 
86 See generally Eric Rosand, Confronting the Nazi Past at the End of the 20th Century: 
The Austrian Model, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 202 (2002). 
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storage since the war.87  The art was auctioned to benefit Holocaust 
survivors and their heirs.88  Then, “[i]n January and February of 1998, 
a series of articles by Hubertus Czernin appeared in the Viennese 
newspaper, Der Standard, reviewing the methods by which Austrian 
National Museum personnel virtually extorted art from Jews who, 
having survived, chose to leave Austria after the War.”89  On 
December 4, 1998, in response to continued exposure regarding 
Austria’s post-war exploitation of gifts from survivors in exchange 
for export permits, the Austrian Parliament enacted legislation to 
provide for “restitution notwithstanding such legal obstacles as the 
statute of limitations.”90 
“Elisabeth Gehrer, [then] Austria’s Minister of Culture, . . . set up a 
museum panel to identify the works that [should] be returned.”91  One 
consequence was that the Rothschild family retrieved 200 pieces of 
 
87 Kelly Ann Falconer, Comment, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally 
Binding International Agreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 383, 416 (2000) (citing CNN Newsroom: A Sale of Art Confiscated from 
Jews During World War II Closes a Chapter in the History of the Holocaust (CNN 
television broadcast Nov. 26, 1996) (“[T]he Austrian government, the people in general, 
either forgot about them or didn’t know what to do with them.  They’re basically heirless 
pieces of art.”)). 
88 Id.  This auction is referred to as the Mauerbach auction. 
89 Constance Lowenthal, Edited Presentation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 133, 135 
(1998). 
90 U.S. STATE DEP’T, Concluding Statement: United States, in WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS, supra note 6, at 125, 127 (1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heac2.pdf; see also 1390 der Beilagen zu 
den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates XX.GP [Federal State Act on the 
Return of Cultural Objects from Austrian Federal Museums and Collections], Dec. 4, 
1998, available at http://www.lootedart.com/MFEU4438589, reprinted in PALMER, supra 
note 48, at 178–79; Styrian Provincial Law of 14 March 2000 on the Return or Taking to 
Account of Works of Art or Cultural Assets Confiscated from Their Owners During the 
Nazi Regime (Austria), available at http://www.lootedart.com/InformationByCountry/ 
Austria/Laws (follow “Styrian Provincial Law of 14 March 2000” hyperlink); Resolution 
of the Vienna City Council of 29 April 1999 on the Return of Artistic and Cultural 
Property from the Museums, Libraries, Archives, Collections and Other Holdings of the 
City of Vienna (Austria), available at http://www.lootedart.com/InformationByCountry/ 
Austria/Laws (follow “Resolution of the Vienna City Council of 29 April 1999” 
hyperlink); Alan Riding, Entr’acte: Whatever Happened to the Art the Nazis Stole?, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., May 13, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/news/ 
13iht-entracte_ed3_.html (“[I]n 1998 [Austria] passed an Art Restitution Act and since 
then it has reviewed its national collections and resolved 92 restitution cases involving 
2,659 works of art . . . .”). 
91 Lowenthal, supra note 89, at 135. 
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art that were auctioned at Christie’s for $90 million.92  But many do 
not believe Austria went far enough in its recent attempts to rectify its 
Nazi past.  In fact, the 2000 U.S. Presidential Commission on 
Holocaust-Era Assets reported “that Austria’s ‘restrictive [post-war] 
restitution process impeded the return of assets to victims.’”93 
Lawrence M. Kaye, a plaintiff’s attorney and partner in the 
Manhattan firm of Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, which has an 
internationally known art law practice and represents the Bondi 
family in U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egan Schiele 
(Wally), summed up the case as follows in 1999: 
 To say that the subpoena created an uproar is to put it mildly.  
Museums claimed to be “shocked,” expressing concern that such 
actions would slow or stem the international flow of artwork into 
New York.  The Austrian government also expressed outrage.  
Various organizations made statements supporting one side or the 
other, and the media weighed in on both sides.  But, to the victims 
of the Holocaust, the subpoena symbolized a willingness to provide 
a much-needed forum to redress past wrongs.  In my view, the 
District Attorney’s actions were a proper and welcome exercise of 
his powers.94 
It can be safely said that Wally launched a new wave of Holocaust-
era art research and claims. Hundreds of those cases have since been 
resolved95 while Wally and others lumber on.96 
 
92 Carol Vogel, At $90 Million, Rothschild Sale Exceeds Goals, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
1999, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/09/world//at-90-million-
rothschild-sale-exceeds-goals.html. 
93 Robert Landauer, Outrageous Behavior Needs Redress, OREGONIAN, June 12, 2004, 
at B5. 
94 Lawrence M. Kaye, A Quick Glance at the Schiele Paintings, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. 
ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 11, 13 (1999).  The author would like to note that, although she 
criticizes Wally, she admires the excellent advocacy skills of Howard N. Spiegler and 
Lawrence M. Kaye, partners in the firm of Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, and she is thankful for 
their willingness to discuss the case. 
95 Mike Boehm, Panel Ponders Legalities of Reclaiming Art, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2004, at 17 (“The number of claims today ‘is probably in the hundreds’. . . .  Most of those 
are being settled without going to court . . . .”); Mark Stryker, Shadow of Holocaust Hangs 
over Museums’ Fight for Paintings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 26, 2006, at E2 (“There 
have been about 30 claims made on U.S. museums for Nazi-looted art in the last decade, a 
dozen of which resulted in the pieces being returned or in restitution, according to the 
American Association of Museums.  Most cases are resolved through quiet 
compromise.”). 
96 Martha Lufkin, US Lawsuit to Confiscate Schiele’s Portrait of Wally Suspended, ART 
NEWSPAPER, Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/US%20lawsuit 
%20to%20confiscate%20Schiele%27s%20Portrait%20of%20Wally%20Suspended/16693. 
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III 
THE FIRST DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION 
The first declaratory judgment case filed involving Nazi-looted art 
was Alsdorf v. Bennigson.97  The case involved a Jewish art collector 
forced to flee Nazi Germany and the subsequent questions as to what 
happened to her art collection.98  After the Nazis’ takeover of Berlin, 
Carlota Landsberg, a Jewish woman living in Berlin, sent Femme en 
Blanc by Pablo Picasso to a Paris art dealer, Justin Thannhauser.99  
After Kristallnacht, November 9–10, 1938, Landsberg and her 
daughter fled Europe, eventually settling in New York in 1940 or 
1941.100  The Nazis stole the painting in Paris in 1940 and, as they 
usually did when looting art, they kept precise records of the painting 
and its last possessor.101 
After the war, Ms. Landsberg, in accordance with the restitution 
mechanisms in place at that time, filed a claim for the painting.102  In 
1958, before his death, Mr. Thannhauser sent her a letter detailing his 
knowledge of the looting and his persistent efforts to locate the 
painting since the war.103  It should also be noted that, as stated in Mr. 
Thannhauser’s letter, the painting was illustrated in a book about 
Picasso’s work, as well as in the Repertoire des Biens Spolies en 
France Durant la Guerre 1939–1945 (List of Property Removed from 
France During the War 1939–1945), recorded under Mr. 
Thannhauser’s name.104  This book, published in 1947,105 is very 
well known and is referred to in art circles as the “Repertoire.”  The 
evidence was overwhelming: the case was one of clear-cut looting, 
and, in 1969, the Berlin Restitution Office paid Ms. Landsberg DM 
100,000, approximately $27,300, without prejudice to her right to 
recover the painting if it ever was located—presumably with the 
understanding that she would have to return the money if she 
 
97 No. 04 C 5953, 2004 WL 2806301 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2004). 
98 Id. at *1–2. 
99 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Bennigson v. Alsdorf, 2004 WL 803616 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. BC287294) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint, Bennigson]. 
100 Howard Reich, Whose Picasso Is It?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.museum-security.org/03/007.html. 
101 Second Amended Complaint, Bennigson, supra note 99, ¶ 2. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. ¶ 8. 
104 Reich, supra note 100, at 1. 
105 Id. 
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successfully recovered the painting.106  “Despite decades-long 
correspondence with the post-war governments of France and 
Germany and with a variety of European art dealers, Landsberg was 
unable to locate the Picasso” before she died in 1994.107 
Meanwhile, in 1975, exactly thirty years after the end of all World 
War II hostilities, New York art dealer Stephen Hahn purchased the 
painting from Maurice Covo, owner and manager of the Renou & 
Poyet art gallery in Paris, France.108  Significantly, the French statute 
of repose is thirty years.109  A few months later, Mr. Hahn sold the 
painting to Marilynn and James Alsdorf, Chicago art connoisseurs 
who have often acted philanthropically by donating paintings to 
museums.110  This information must be viewed in light of the fact 
that, during the war, the Renou & Poyet gallery “was known as Renou 
& Colle, and a report from the United States’ Office of Strategic 
Services on that Paris gallery called it a ‘firm of art dealers who 
handled looted art, notably from the Paul Rosenberg Collection.’”111 
In 2002, the Alsdorfs attempted to sell the painting through an 
agent who shipped the art to Geneva, Switzerland, where it was 
viewed by a Paris art dealer on behalf of a potential client.112  As part 
of his due diligence, the dealer contacted the Art Loss Register in 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2262 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm; see also Greek Orthodox Partriarchate of 
Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 WL 673347, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 30, 1999) (noting that the French Civil Code bars actions for real and personal 
property after thirty years of prescriptive possession).  But see Warin v. Wildenstein & 
Co., 746 N.Y.S.2d 282, 282 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to “take judicial notice of the 
subject French Ordinances for lack of information sufficient to enable [the court] to 
determine their scope and effect”). 
110 Reich, supra note 100, at 1.  It should also be noted that James Alsdorf, now 
deceased, “‘was a board member of the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR), 
which was created in 1969 to educate the public about problems and issues in the art 
world,’ [and] ‘IFAR helped expand the Art Loss Register’s data base [sic] of lost 
artworks.’”  Id. (quoting Alsdorf’s statements in a court declaration).  Additionally, 
Marilynn Alsdorf presently is head of the Art Institute of Chicago’s committee on 
European painting, and the “‘Alsdorf Foundation is currently a financial supporter of 
IFAR.’” Id. (quoting Alsdorf’s statements in a court declaration). 
111 Reich, supra note 100, at 1. 
112 Cross Complaint of Claimant Thomas G. Bennigson ¶ 15, United States v. One Oil 
Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc” by Pablo Picasso, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) [hereinafter Complaint, Femme en Blanc]. 
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London, England, 113 which ran a report that revealed the painting’s 
tainted past.114 
The Art Loss Register continued to investigate and initially thought 
that the sole heir to the painting was the Silva Casa Foundation, a 
Swiss foundation related to the Thannhauser family.115  The Art Loss 
Register began negotiating on the foundation’s behalf—first with the 
dealer and then with the Alsdorfs’ Los Angeles attorney.116  Around 
May 2002, the Art Loss Register discovered that Mr. Thannhauser 
had been holding the painting on behalf of Ms. Landsberg.117  The 
Art Loss Register later discovered that Ms. Landsberg had passed 
away and it located her sole heir, Thomas C. Bennigson.118 
The Femme en Blanc litigation started as a civil replevin case filed 
by Mr. Bennigson in a California state court.119  The day after the 
case was filed, the Alsdorfs shipped the painting back to Chicago, 
Illinois,120 which had less favorable law for claimants than 
California.121  Because the painting was no longer in California, the 
California court granted a motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction 
grounds filed by the Alsdorfs.122  While Mr. Bennigson was seeking 
relief in the California Supreme Court, the Alsdorfs filed a 
 
113 Id. ¶ 16. 
114 Id. ¶ 22.  This also indicates that, at least for present-day purchases of high-quality 
art created before World War II, seeking information about a painting’s provenance during 
and after World War II is expected of one afforded bona fide purchaser status. 
115 Brief of Respondent Marilyn Alsdorf at 5, 2004 WL 803616 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 
2004) (No. B168200). 
116 See Complaint, Femme en Blanc, supra  note 112, ¶ 20. 
117 Id. ¶ 21. 
118 Id. ¶ 23. 
119 Bennigson v. Alsdorf, No. B168200, 2004 WL 803616, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 
2004). 
120 Id. at *2. 
121 California’s legislature extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for Holocaust-
era art litigation against museums and galleries.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(c) (West 
2004).  The statute was later held unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit, which identified 
its broad scope as follows: 
The scope of the statute as enacted belies California’s purported interest in 
protecting its residents and regulating its art trade.  The amended version of § 
354.3 suggests that California’s real purpose was to create a friendly forum for 
litigating Holocaust restitution claims, open to anyone in the world to sue a 
museum or gallery located within or without the state. 
von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-56691, 2009 WL 
2516336, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2009). 
122 Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616, at *3. 
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declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois in Chicago to seek to quiet title in relation 
to the painting.123  This case has since been dismissed following 
settlement,124 likely sparked when both the FBI seized the painting in 
Chicago and brought it back to California and the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in Los Angeles initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against the 
painting in rem.125  All litigation has since been dismissed because 
Mr. Bennigson and the Alsdorfs settled all the claims between them 
for $6.5 million.126 
IV 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS GET TEETH 
In December 2003, the heirs of Margarete Mauthner asserted a 
claim to Vue de l’Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-Remy, by Vincent 
Van Gogh, against Elizabeth Taylor, which triggered both another 
declaratory judgment action in 2004 and, in early 2005, a suit filed 
separately by the claimants—and seemingly subsequently 
consolidated with the declaratory action.127  The painting had been 
owned by Ms. Mauthner during the 1920s and 1930s, but there was 
no evidence of when or how the painting left her possession.128  Ms. 
Taylor’s father, an art dealer, purchased the painting for her in 1963 at 
Sotheby’s in London for £92,000.129  The purchase was publicly 
known.130  In 2001, the Mauthner heirs hired a lawyer to explore 
Holocaust claims on their part, and, it seems, he identified Ms. Taylor 
as the possessor of the painting in 2002.131 
 
123 Alsdorf v. Bennigson, No. 04 C 5953, 2004 WL 2806301, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 
2004). 
124 Bennigson v. Alsdorf, No. S124828, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 13370, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2005) 
(dismissing pursuant to notice of settlement). 
125 Complaint, Femme en Blanc, supra note 112, ¶ 1; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, $10 Million Picasso Painting Stolen by Nazis During World War II Seized 
by U.S. (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.bhba.org/PR/PR-CFTA-FBI-10-04.htm. 
126 Bob Egelko, Suit over a Picasso Settled, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2005, at B1. 
127 Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK(FMOX), 2005 WL 4658511, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 2, 2005). 
128 Id. 
129 Danielle Demetriou, Elizabeth Taylor, Her Van Gogh Masterpiece and a Legal Row 
over Looting in Nazi Germany, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), May 28, 2004, at 3, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/elizabeth-taylor-her-van-gogh-
masterpiece-and-a-legal-row-over-looting-in-nazi-germany-565004.html. 
130 Adler, 2005 WL 4658511, at *5. 
131 Id. at *1. 
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The plaintiffs in this case attempted to broaden the legal grounds 
for restitution to all situations where it seemed that the painting would 
not have been sold but for the rise of the Nazi regime to power.132  In 
other words, they sought to broaden the definition of “forced sale” to 
incorporate virtually any sale by a Jew within the German Reich, 
particularly after the passage of the Nuremberg laws.133  Essentially, 
the Mauthner heirs alleged, without proof beyond the general 
conditions in Germany, that the painting was sold because of Ms. 
Mauthner’s need to flee after the Nazis rose to power.  What is 
significant is what their claim lacked: any evidence concerning either 
the conditions of the sale, assuming one occurred, or how Ms. 
Mauthner otherwise lost possession of the painting in 1939.134  
Awarding restitution in such a case would do one of two things (or 
both): (1) it would shift the burden of proving a voluntary sale to the 
present-day possessor or (2) it would eliminate the need to show 
proximate cause between Nazi decree and the transfer of the 
particular painting in question. 
The court rather quickly dismissed the heirs’ purported federal 
claim because no federal law gave rise to a private right of action135 
and it dismissed the state law claims on statute of limitations 
grounds—assuming, without deciding, that the discovery rule would 
have applied to the dispute.136  The court did not even explore 
whether the painting had been sold for fair market value.137  The 
decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 
18, 2007.138  The U.S. Supreme Court denied the claimant’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari on October 29, 2007.139  Taylor was the first 
U.S. Nazi-era art case to be dismissed on statute of limitations 
grounds.  This case can nonetheless be credited with having launched 
a small wave of claims attempting to increase the number of artworks 
subject to restitution because of their ownership histories during 
World War II—even if those histories would not seem to support a 
legal claim under current case law. 
 
132 Id. at *3. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 Id. at *4–5. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2007). 
139 Orkin v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 491, 492 (2007). 
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V 
MUSEUM-DRIVEN DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS140 
U.S. museums have now started to respond to claims they have 
received, but that have not yet been filed in court, by filing 
declaratory judgment actions to remove any cloud on title.  First, as 
discussed in more detail below, two U.S. museums faced with claims 
by the heirs of Martha Nathan, the widow of Hugo Nathan, a 
prominent Jewish collector from Frankfurt, decided to file declaratory 
judgment actions to resolve ownership of two paintings.141  The 
claimants’ arguments were similar to those in the Adler v. Taylor 
case.142  This was the first time any museum had decided to initiate 
litigation when faced with demands for artwork by Holocaust 
survivors or their heirs.143  The museums won both cases on statute of 
limitations grounds.144  The heirs described Congress’ allocation of 
funds for provenance research in the Holocaust Victims Redress Act 
without also creating any federal cause of action as “taunting 
Holocaust victims by providing them with information to help them 
locate Nazi-confiscated assets, while denying them a judicial remedy 
to reclaim their property if they can find it.”145 
Since then, more declaratory judgment actions have been filed to 
ward off potential claims to artworks with ownership histories 
showing a transfer during the Nazi era, especially where the transfer 
lacks certain indicia of looting, Aryanization, or forced auction.146  
The claimants argue that all artworks sold by Jews into the depressed 
 
140 Significant portions of Part V and Part VI of this Article reproduce the author’s 
work in Jennifer Anglim Kreder, U.S. Declaratory Judgment Actions Concerning Art 
Displaced During the Holocaust, 4 KUNSTRECHTSSPIEGEL 181 (2008) (University of 
Heidelberg, Germany). 
141 Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 803 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Detroit 
Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007).  
For more detail, see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, U.S. Museums’ Use of Declaratory Judgment 
Actions in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, ART, CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS & HERITAGE L. 
COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Int’l Bar Ass’n, Legal Practice Div., London, U.K.), Oct. 2007, at 
7–8 [hereinafter Kreder, U.S. Declaratory Judgment Actions]. 
142 Compare supra Part II, with infra Parts V.A–B. 
143 See Kreder, U.S. Declaratory Judgment Actions, supra note 141, at 7–8. 
144 See infra Part V.A. 
145 Reply Brief of Appellants at 12, Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 
05-55364).  See generally Alexandra Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of Laches in 
World War II-Era Art Theft Disputes: It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
349 (2004). 
146 See infra Parts V.A–B. 
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art market after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, and the resulting 
economic oppression of Jews, should be considered “duress sales” or 
“forced sales” and the artwork should be restituted.147  According to 
the claimants, the concept of an illegal “forced sale” includes sales 
made because of the general economic pressure put on Jews by the 
Nuremberg laws, not limited to just those sales made pursuant to 
either a specific Nazi decree applicable to the artwork at issue or the 
express threat of physical harm for failing to transfer the specific 
artwork.148  The declaratory actions are inviting U.S. judges to draw 
the line between forced and voluntary sales—and to decide who must 
bear the burden of proof.149 
A.  Museums Against Nathan Heirs 
Without filing suit, the Nathan heirs asserted claims to The Diggers 
by Vincent Van Gogh, located in the Detroit Institute of Arts, and 
Street Scene in Tahiti by Paul Gaugin, located in the Toledo Museum 
of Art.150  The heirs claimed the paintings were sold under duress.151  
The museums, however, claimed the sales were voluntary and for fair 
market value in 1938—after Ms. Nathan emigrated to Paris from 
Frankfurt.152 
According to the claimants, after Ms. Nathan emigrated, she was 
forced to relinquish property she had left behind in Germany.153  The 
paintings, however, were not among that property.154  The paintings 
were located in Switzerland.155  In December 1938, a year and a half 
 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 The importance of such a distinction is not limited to Nazi-era art claims.  See 
generally Stuart P. Green, Looting, Law, and Lawlessness, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1129 (2007) 
(analyzing the continuum of looting as a range from predatory and exploitive to ordinary 
acts of burglary and larceny committed out of necessity during Hurricane Katrina). 
150 Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 803 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Detroit 
Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). 
151 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804–05; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 
WL 1016996, at *1. 
152 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 
1016996, at *1. 
153 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 
1016996, at *2. 
154 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 
1016996, at *1. 
155 See Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804–05; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 
WL 1016996, at *1. 
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after emigrating to Paris, she sold Street Scene in Tahiti and The 
Diggers—for approximately $6,000 and $9,360, respectively—to a 
group of three prominent Jewish art dealers who had known her for 
many years.156  In May 1939, the Toledo Museum of Art bought 
Street Scene in Tahiti from Wildenstein & Company for $25,000.157  
In 1969, the Detroit Institute of Arts received The Diggers as a 
donation from collector Robert H. Tannahill, who bought it in 1941 
for $34,000.158  Street Scene in Tahiti is currently estimated to be 
worth between $10 and $15 million.159  The Diggers is estimated at 
$15 million.160 
In January 2006, the Toledo Museum of Art filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to quiet title to Street 
Scene in Tahiti.161  The heirs then counterclaimed for conversion and 
restitution.162  On December 28, 2006, the court ruled that the Ohio 
four-year statute of limitations, modified by the discovery rule, 
controlled the case.163  In essence, the discovery rule provides that, in 
certain cases, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the 
claimant has, or should have, knowledge of the claim and the correct 
entity to sue.164  The discovery rule is applied to conversion and 
restitution cases in the majority of U.S. states with some variation.165  
Without making a determination as to exactly when the statute of 
limitations began to run under the discovery rule, the court found the 
claim time-barred because the painting was openly displayed in 
 
156 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804–05; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 
1016996, at *1. 
157 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
158 Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1; Legal Battle Ends over Nazi-Era 
Gauguin, Van Gogh, ARTNET MAG., May 15, 2007, http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/ 
news/artnetnews/artnetnews5-15-07.asp. 
159 Tahree Lane, Judge Rejects Claim to Gauguin Painting, TOLEDO BLADE (Ohio), 
Dec. 29, 2006, http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061229/NEWS15/ 
612290337/-1/NEWS. 
160 Mark Stryker, Heirs Ask DIA to Pay: $15 Million Van Gogh in Dispute, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Apr. 28, 2006. 
161 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 808–09. 
164 See, e.g., id. at 807.  See generally Lauren F. Redman, A Wakeup Call for a Uniform 
Statute of Limitations in Art Restitution Cases, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 203 (2008); 
Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between 
Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955, 1005 n.258 
(2001). 
165 See generally, e.g., Redman, supra note 164; Reyhan, supra note 164. 
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Toledo and internationally since 1939 with public acknowledgment of 
Ms. Nathan’s prior ownership.166  Ms. Nathan died of natural causes 
in 1958.167  By that time, she had pursued her other Aryanized and 
liquidated property but she never asserted any claims to the paintings, 
which, in the court’s view, she easily could have done if she believed 
she had valid claims.168  Moreover, in 1958, there was an accounting 
of Ms. Nathan’s estate, and additional Holocaust-related claims were 
asserted as to other property.169 
The court also held that the fact that the museum had posted 
information related to the painting on its website, in accordance with 
the AAM guidelines, did not waive the museum’s time-bar 
defenses.170  After investigating the Nathan heirs’ claim, the Toledo 
Museum of Art concluded that it was most appropriate to deny the 
claim and file a declaratory judgment action against the heirs.171  This 
approach is not expressly contemplated by the AAM guidelines, but 
the guidelines should not be interpreted to mean that every claim 
should be honored regardless of what provenance research 
subsequently reveals.172 
Perhaps most controversial is the court’s statement as to the 
importance of U.S. congressional hearings since 1998 concerning 
Nazi looting.  The court stated, arguably in dicta: 
At the very latest, sixty years after the sale of the Painting, the 
public debate surrounding Nazi-era assets should have led the 
Nathan heirs to inquire into the location of her former assets.  Based 
upon Martha Nathan’s own previous claims, as well as those of her 
estate, the heirs knew she was persecuted by the Nazis and 
sustained wartime losses.  This knowledge would have led a 
reasonable person to make further inquiries.173 
In early 2006, the Detroit Institute of Arts also filed a declaratory 
judgment action in a federal court in Michigan against the Nathan 
heirs in regard to The Diggers.174  On March 31, 2007, the court ruled 
 
166 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 808. 
167 Id. at 805. 
168 Id. at 807. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 808. 
171 Id. at 805. 
172 See supra Introduction (discussing AAM guidelines). 
173 Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807. 
174 Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 31, 2007). 
 2009] The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and Holocaust-Era Claims 65 
against the Nathan heirs using similar, but not identical, logic to that 
of the court in the Toledo Museum of Art case.175  In contrast, the 
Michigan court ruled that the discovery rule did not apply because 
Michigan policy favors market certainty in cases alleging commercial 
conversion.176  Thus, the court expressly ruled that the claim accrued 
in 1938, which means the three-year Michigan statute of limitations 
expired in 1941.177  This precedent will make claimants’ negotiating 
positions regarding art presently located in Michigan quite weak. 
B.  The Schoeps Cases 
Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was “a prominent and affluent 
German banker and art collector, patriarch of one branch of an 
extraordinarily distinguished German family of Jewish descent, 
representative of that branch of the family as a director of 
Mendelssohn & Co. Bank, and proprietor of the ancestral estate 
outside of Berlin, Schloss Börnicke.”178  In 1927, he married his 
second wife, Elsa Lucy Emmy Lolo von Lavergue-Peguilhen (later 
Countess Kesselstatt), who was not Jewish.179 
Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had bequeathed The Absinthe Drinker 
(Angel de Soto) by Pablo Picasso to his second wife, who was 
“Aryan” under Nazi laws.180  Transferring wealth to an Aryan family 
member or friend via a “Verfolgten-Testament” was a common 
practice to try to insulate property from Nazi expropriation, and, thus, 
the validity of the wife’s title came into question.181  The second wife 
seemingly sold the painting to art dealer Justin K. Thannhauser, and 
the painting was then transferred to New York within the next two to 
four years, where it was subsequently bought and sold multiple times 
before eventually being purchased by the Andrew Lloyd Webber Art 
 
175 Id. at *2–3. 
176 Id. at *3. 
177 Id. 
178 Complaint for Declaratory Relief ¶ 2, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. 
Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 CV 11074), 2007 WL 5161566 [hereinafter 
Complaint, Schoeps]. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. ¶¶ 28, 35. 
181 Schoeps v. Andrew Lloyd Webber Art Found. (Schoeps I), No. 116768/06, 2007 
WL 4098215, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2007). 
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Foundation.182  In 2006, a suit was filed by Julius Schoeps, an heir of 
Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, after an attempted auction.183 
The case was dismissed on the grounds that Mr. Schoeps could not 
initiate a suit on behalf of the entire estate without complying with 
additional requirements.184  He reportedly intends to re-file the suit 
against the Andrew Lloyd Webber Art Foundation after complying 
with the requirements.185 
The Museum of Modern Art and the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Foundation subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York as to Boy 
Leading a Horse (1906) and Le Moulin de la Galette (1909), both 
painted by Pablo Picasso, against Mr. Schoeps.186  Both paintings’ 
ownership histories, like that of The Absinthe Drinker, have identical 
original ownership by Paul Robert Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy 
and subsequent ownership by the art dealer Thannhauser.187  The 
Museums alleged that Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy gave the paintings 
to his second wife as a wedding gift in 1927, and hence the paintings 
were excluded from his will, which was executed by his estate in May 
1935 after his death from heart problems.188 
Mr. Schoeps maintained that Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy never 
gifted the paintings to his second wife.189  Schoeps argued that, after 
the Nuremberg laws began to devastate Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s 
wealth, he secretly sent the paintings on commission to Mr. 
Thannhauser in Switzerland.190  Further, Schoeps maintained that 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy died unexpectedly of heart complications 
never having told anyone about his secret.191  Mr. Schoeps pointed to 
interesting documentation from Thannhauser’s files, described below, 
to support his argument that Mr. Thannhauser either stole the 
 
182 Id.; Complaint, Schoeps, supra note 178, ¶¶ 33–35. 
183 Schoeps I, 2007 WL 4098215, at *1. 
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188 Id. ¶ 2. 
189 See First Amended Counterclaim ¶ 27, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. 
Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 CV 11074 (JSR)), 2008 WL 2308984 [hereinafter 
Counterclaim, Schoeps]. 
190 Id. ¶ 46. 
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paintings after Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s death or bought them 
for a price far below fair market value.192 
Mr. Thannhauser was a prominent Jewish art dealer in Berlin who 
fled Germany in 1937.193  He continued as a prominent art dealer and 
collector, first in Paris and then in New York, until his death in 
1976.194  After the war, Mr. Thannhauser actively sought the return of 
many artworks on behalf of himself and those who had consigned 
works to him.195  After his death, his extensive records were archived 
to assist in future restitutions.196  Much of his art collection was 
donated to the Museum of Modern Art.197 
Mr. Thannhauser was an active purchaser of art from European 
Jews, at least through 1939.198  For example, Thannhauser was one of 
the three Jewish art dealers who purchased The Diggers (1899) and 
Street Scene in Tahiti (1891) from Ms. Nathan in 1938.199  
Additionally, Thannhauser’s name was in the ownership history of 
Femme en Blanc (1922), the subject of the litigation between Alsdorf 
and Bennigson described above.200 
Mr. Schoeps’s suit compels one to ask whether Mr. Thannhauser’s 
purchases should be viewed as benevolent acts, neutral business, or 
immoral profiteering.  Schoeps plainly asserted the latter: 
 Thannhauser trafficked in stolen and Nazi-looted art during his 
career as a dealer.  Both during and after World War II, 
Thannhauser partnered with art dealers such as Nazi Cesar Mange 
de Hauke and Albert Skira, both of whom the U.S. State 
Department and others identified as traffickers in Nazi-looted 
art.201 
There is no doubt that Thannhauser’s family would vehemently deny 
the allegation that Mr. Thannhauser acted immorally, particularly in 
 
192 Id. ¶¶ 29, 48. 
193 Complaint, Schoeps, supra note 178, ¶ 24. 
194 Id. ¶¶ 1, 24. 
195 Id. ¶ 44. 
196 See id. ¶¶ 43, 44. 
197 Id. ¶ 1. 
198 Id. ¶¶ 1, 24. 
199 See supra Part V.A. 
200 See supra Part III. 
201 Answer and Counterclaim ¶ 40, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 
543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 CV 11074 (JSR)), 2008 WL 1982812 (citing Maureen 
Goggin & Walter V. Robinson, Murky Histories Cloud Some Local Art, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 9, 1997, at A1). 
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light of his post-war efforts to assist Jews seeking restitution of works 
sent to him on commission.202  However, this is not the first time 
accusations regarding Thannhauser’s wartime conduct have been 
made.203 
Logically, Schoeps lacked any documentational evidence 
supporting his views that Mr. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy never gifted 
the paintings to his second wife and only secretly sent the paintings to 
Thannhauser on commission.  Schoeps stated the following: 
[T]he Museums’ claims that Mendelssohn-Bartholdy gifted all of 
his art collection to Elsa in 1927 at the time of their wedding is far-
fetched.  There is no record of such a gift any time near the 
wedding.  Indeed, the only evidence of any Mendelssohn-Bartholdy 
transfer of art to Elsa is Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s February 1935 
Contract for the Disposition of Property, which Schoeps will 
establish was a mere device to protect the Paintings from Nazi 
predation by creating a false impression that Elsa was the owner 
from 1927 forward.204 
Mr. Schoeps described the sale as “a textbook example of a 
‘fencing’ operation for stolen merchandise and a conspiracy to traffic 
in stolen art.”205  Schoeps relied, in part, on William S. Paley, the 
founder and chairman of CBS, for the following rendition of the sale 
in 1936: 
Thannhauser—while peering through a window outside watching 
the sale go down—used Swiss art dealer Albert Skira (who later 
developed a reputation as a notorious trafficker in Nazi-looted art) 
to make the sale to Paley in Switzerland, already widely known as a 
venue for unloading Nazi-looted art.  In addition, Skira seemed 
desperate to make the sale.  He and Thannhauser were offering Boy 
Leading a Horse for an artificially low price, and Skira even refused 
 
202 See Complaint, Schoeps, supra note 178, ¶ 44. 
203 Goggin & Robinson, supra note 201, at A1. 
204 Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 201, ¶ 42. 
205 Id. ¶ 41.  Additionally, the Art Loss Register’s letter provided to the Museum of 
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Id. at Exhibit 2 (Letter from Lucy Haverland, Art Loss Register to Christel Hollevoet-
Force, Research Assistant, Provenance, Museum of Modern Art (Sept. 18, 2001) (The next 
1.5 pages are redacted, but it is not stated by whom or why.  The remainder was omitted 
by the author.)). 
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to tell Paley who the owner was.  Yet, somehow the “modest” price 
for Boy Leading a Horse enabled Skira, Thannhauser—and possibly 
another dealer, Rosengart—to make enough of a profit that it was 
worth driving the entire length of Switzerland through the Alps to 
make sure the sale occurred. . . . Moreover, any time Thannhauser 
was asked about the provenance of these five significant Picasso 
artworks he obtained from the well-known Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, 
Thannhauser was uncharacteristically vague and non-specific.  For 
example, in 1964 when he sold Madame Soler to the Pinakothek der 
Moderne Museum in Munich, Thannhauser provided detailed 
information regarding the history of Madame Soler.  However, 
when it came [time] to [provide] past owners (provenance), 
Thannhauser merely inserted “Sammlung (collection) Paul von 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy” without providing any dates—the only 
entry on the page with no dates. . . . When Thannhauser donated Le 
Moulin de la Galette and Head of a Woman to the Guggenheim, he 
was equally vague.  Thannhauser stated that he acquired Le Moulin 
de la Galette from Mendelssohn-Bartholdy “ca. [around] 1935.”206 
As the parties had opposing views of the evidence, the 
determination of which party would bear the burden of proof in the 
litigation was extremely important.  Schoeps’s Answer laid out the 
legal theories supporting his expansive view of the term “forced 
sales” and how, in his view, the applicable law requires a presumption 
of this classification as to all transfers of property from a Jew to a 
non-Jew in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1945.207  Such a 
presumption would be almost akin to placing the burden of proof 
upon the museums.  The museum’s Complaint tried to head off this 
argument: 
 Even if there were such a presumption of duress, that 
presumption is rebutted by the evidence.  The facts and 
circumstances establish that both von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and 
his wife were free to decide whether or not to sell their artwork, 
were free to move artwork in and out of Germany without 
discrimination, were not under financial pressure to sell as the 
Paintings represented a negligible percentage of their net worth, and 
neither the German State nor the Nazi party played any role in 
directing, urging or otherwise threatening any adverse consequences 
if the Paintings were not sold to Thannhauser. . . . The allegation 
 
206 Id. ¶ 41 (quoting WILLIAM S. PALEY, AS IT  HAPPENED: A MEMOIR 107 (1979)) 
(citations omitted) (third alteration in source).  Schoeps relies on a document from 
Pinakothek der Moderne that was given to the Museum of Modern Art by Thannhauser in, 
or around, 1964, which is attached to the Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit 3, and 
Guggenheim records, which are attached as Exhibits 4 and 5. 
207 Counterclaim, Schoeps, supra note 189, ¶ 51.  Primarily, he relied on Military 
Government Law No. 59, a U.S. law addressing restitution of property following World 
War II, and related European post-war restitution laws. 
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that the Nazi government would force von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy 
and his wife to sell the Paintings to the Jewish art dealer 
Thannhauser, whom they knew and with whom they had done 
business for years, is completely implausible, as is the claim that 
they had to sell the Paintings because Nazi persecution had left 
them impoverished.208 
Mr. Schoeps advocated for an aggressive shift of the burden of 
proof in all cases involving claims for art transferred during the Nazi 
era—like the burden of proof shift that was advocated unsuccessfully 
in Orkin.209 
In January, the Schoeps II court performed a “substantial interest” 
conflicts analysis based on New York choice-of-law rules to 
determine which nation’s law would control various aspects of the 
case.210  The court held that German law “plainly” controlled whether 
the painting was transferred to the second wife under duress 
conditions.211  The court applied the five factors relevant to an 
interest analysis in a contract case—as to the initial sale by the second 
wife, not as to the subsequent sales in Switzerland or New York.212  
Those factors are as follows: (1) place of contracting, (2) place of 
negotiation, (3) place of performance, (4) location of the subject 
matter of the contract, and (5) domicile or place of business of the 
contracting parties.213  The court rejected the argument out of hand, 
and neither party even raised the idea that Swiss law might apply to 
the issue, even though one theory of the facts was that the painting 
was in Switzerland as long as four years.214 
As to the issue of the “validity and legal effect of the sale” of the 
painting in Switzerland, a separate conflicts analysis was necessary to 
determine whether “that sale . . . might create a ‘good faith purchaser’ 
defense for the [possessor] even if the transfer [in Germany] were 
infected with duress.”215  The issue was essential because Swiss and 
New York law, the two potentially relevant laws, are diametrically 
opposed in terms of whether the present-day possessor might be able 
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to credibly assert such a defense.216  Under New York law, it is by 
now axiomatic that one cannot obtain title from a thief unless—under 
narrow circumstances—the present-day possessor’s title traces to 
someone with whom the original owner voluntarily entrusted the 
art.217 
In applying interest analysis, the court noted: 
In disputes over transfers of personal property, interest analysis will 
often lead to the conclusion that the law of the forum where the 
transfer took place applies . . . . But such a result is not inevitable, 
and where another forum has a more significant relationship to the 
parties and the property, that forum’s law will apply. . . . In 
particular, when the parties did not intend that the property would 
remain in the jurisdiction where the transfer took place, that forum 
will have a lesser interest in having its law applied.218 
In sum, New York law applied because: (1) the painting was 
immediately shipped from Switzerland to New York, (2) the painting 
was paid for by a check made out to a New York bank, (3) none of 
the purported owners were Swiss residents or citizens at the relevant 
time, and (4) the painting had been in New York seventy years, 
mainly housed in a major New York cultural institution.219  Schoeps 
II was set for trial in February 2009, but the case was settled on the 
courthouse steps.220  Judge Rakoff indicated that the parties would 
have to show cause why their settlement should remain confidential, 
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commercial certainty policy “does not extend to transactions which take place beyond its 
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220 Larry Neumeister, Picasso Paintings to Stay at NYC Museums, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
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noting the historical importance of the case.221  He stated, “I find it 
extraordinarily unfortunate that the public will be left without 
knowing what the truth is.”222  In the end, the settlement remained 
confidential despite the museum’s agreement to waive the 
confidentiality provisions of the settlement and Judge Rakoff’s urging 
the plaintiffs to change their stance on confidentiality in the future.223 
C.  Seger-Thomschitz Claims 
Meanwhile, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston filed a declaratory 
judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts on January 22, 2008, which it recently won on 
summary judgment.224  This case concerns a claim to Two Nudes 
(Lovers) (1913) by Oskar Kokoschka asserted by Dr. Claudia Seger-
Thomschitz.225  The museum alleged that the sale by Dr. Oskar 
Reichel, a Jewish doctor, art collector, and owner of a Viennese 
gallery that was Aryanized, after the Anschluss of Austria, into the 
Third Reich on March 12, 1938, was voluntary.226  The purchaser of 
the painting (and three other Kokoschka paintings) was Otto Kallir, a 
Viennese art dealer who had moved to Paris by the time of the sale in 
February 1939.227  The museum alleged that Dr. Reichel and Mr. 
Kallir had known each other for many years and often had done 
business together.228  In 1943, Reichel died in Vienna of natural 
causes.229 
When Dr. Reichel’s son asserted post-war restitution claims to 
Reichel’s art collection via a Viennese lawyer, he never sought 
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recovery of the Kokoschka paintings.230  Two Nudes (Lovers) was 
subsequently purchased by another dealer and sold to Sarah Blodgett 
either in late 1947 or early 1948, and she subsequently bequeathed it 
to the museum upon her death in 1972.231  It has been publicly 
displayed since.232 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz made factual allegations that, had they been 
sufficiently proven, could have provided the court with sufficient 
grounds to clarify the line between forced and voluntary sales, as well 
as refine the statute of limitations and laches analyses in such 
cases.233  Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued that it is excusable that the 
son pursuing post-war restitution did not know of his father’s claims 
to the Kokoschka paintings because of the dispersal of the family 
resulting from Nazi persecution, including the murder of one of Dr. 
Reichel’s sons in 1940 or 1941.234  Another son, Hans, fled Austria 
by June 1938.235  A third son, Raimund, fled in March 1939.236  In 
November 1938, Reichel’s art gallery, including its paintings, which 
were mostly by Romako, was liquidated because of his Jewish 
heritage.237  The family’s apartment house was liquidated in 1941.238  
In January 1943, Dr. Reichel’s wife, Malvine, was deported to 
Therensiestadt where she survived the war and eventually joined 
Hans in the United States.239 
The brothers’ post-war restitution application included a notarized 
statement by Raimund asserting that “‘[a] large art collection [owned 
by my father] was sold by force: 47 pictures by the painter Anton 
Romako.’”240  No mention was made of the Kokoschka paintings,241 
but Dr. Reichel died after his wife had been deported to 
Therensiestadt and his sons had already fled; the sons only had their 
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own recollections to rely on and would not have known about the 
Kokoschka paintings due to their lack of access to the Austrian 
records that contained Dr. Reichel’s Property Declaration—at least 
until the records were first made public in 1993.242 
Significantly, Exhibit 1 of the Answer and Counterclaim showed 
that Dr. Seger-Thomschitz herself was put on notice to investigate 
any remaining claims of Reichel’s heirs when the Vienna Community 
Council for Culture and Science contacted her upon its own more 
recent review of Viennese public collections,243 which, the court 
determined, was, at the latest, the moment that the limitations period 
began to run based on Massachusetts’s discovery rule.244  In a 
November 10, 2003, letter to Dr. Seger-Thomschitz expressing its 
conclusion that it must restitute certain Romako paintings, the Vienna 
Community Council for Culture and Science noted as follows: 
 In January 1939, Vita Künstler, whom Otto Kallir, after his 
escape to the USA, had appointed as director of the “New Gallery” . 
. . approached the Municipal Collections with offers of “particularly 
high-quality pictures by Romako,” whom [sic] she “just so 
happened to have in the gallery.”  Thereafter, the Municipal 
Collections acquired five paintings by Anton Romako . . . . 
 It is certain that these paintings involved art objects from the 
property of Dr. Oskar Reichel and which, in connection with the 
power seizure by National Socialism, he had to sell due to his 
persecution as a Jew to the galleries mentioned . . . .245 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz argued that the fact that the Romako 
paintings were transferred to Mr. Kallir with payment transferred into 
blocked accounts is evidence of what likely happened in regard to the 
Kokoschka paintings, which also were listed on the Property 
Declaration.246  However, the Answer and Counterclaim do not 
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clearly allege that the proceeds of the sale, if any, of the Kokoschkas 
actually went into a blocked account.247 
The key difference between the Romako paintings and the 
Kokoschka paintings is that Mr. Kallir managed to get the Kokoschka 
paintings out of Vienna.  Thus, what had to be determined was 
whether Kallir and Dr. Reichel managed to defeat Nazi attempts to 
steal the Kokoschka paintings and actually reached a voluntary sale 
for an amount close to fair market value, or whether Kallir alone, or 
in conjunction with Viennese Nazis, stole the painting.  The issue, 
however, now appears to be moot given that the court has granted the 
museum’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dr. Seger-
Thomschitz’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.248 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz was also sued in a declaratory action filed 
by a collector in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana by the current holder of Portrait of a Youth (Hans Reichel) 
(1910), another painting by Oskar Kokoschka.249  The facts are 
similar. 
VI 
ONE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CASE GOES TO TRIAL AND IS 
APPEALED 
Bakalar v. Vavra concerned a dispute between the heirs of Fritz 
Grunbaum and David Bakalar, who filed an action for declaratory 
judgment, tortious interference with contractual relations, and slander 
of title in regard to Seated Woman with Bent Left Leg (Torso), a 
drawing by Egon Schiele.250  As a prominent Jewish entertainer in 
Vienna with a significant art collection, Fritz Grunbaum was arrested 
eight days after the March 12, 1938, Anschluss.251  He was shipped to 
Dachau Concentration Camp where he was forced to sign a power of 
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attorney certificate, before he died on January 14, 1941, to provide his 
wife, Elisabeth, with the legal power to manage his assets in 
accordance with Nazi law.252  Nazi law, beginning April 26, 1938, 
forced Austrian Jews, including Elisabeth on Fritz’s behalf, to sign 
property declarations listing their assets, specifically including art 
collections, for assessment by Nazi appraisers.253  The pinnacle legal 
farce in this case is that, before being arrested and shipped off to her 
death in the Minsk Concentration Camp in October 1942, Elisabeth 
was forced to sign Fritz’s death certificate, which stated that “there is 
no estate . . . [and] in the absence of an estate, there are no estate-
related proceedings.”254 
The parties dispute whether Fritz’s sister-in-law sold the artworks, 
the conditions under which any alleged sale occurred in 1956, and 
whether title could have transferred from Fritz after his arrest, but, 
regardless of the circumstances, the artworks were purchased by 
Eberhard Kornfeld, a partner in the Swiss art gallery Gutekunst & 
Klipstein.255  The gallery was founded by Otto Kallir, whose 
historical reputation as someone who fled approaching Nazi 
persecution and rescued much modern art has been questioned in the 
Seger-Thomschitz litigation.256  The gallery is known to have sold 
artworks seized by the Nazis.257  It sold the Schiele drawing, 
approximately six months after purchasing it in 1956, to a New York 
gallery, which subsequently sold it to Mr. Bakalar in 1963.258 
Interestingly, in an attempt to certify a defendant class of present-
day possessors of Fritz Grunbaum’s art, the Grunbaum heirs sought 
discovery from Galerie St. Etienne, Sotheby’s, and Christie’s, to 
identify owners or possessors of artworks previously belonging to 
Fritz Grunbaum and provenance documents for those artworks, an 
attempt which the trial court disallowed.259  The trial court also 
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denied Bakalar’s motion for summary judgment on the defense of 
laches.260 
Very significantly, on May 30, 2008, the district court ruled in 
limine that Austrian and Swiss law conflicted because Austrian law 
does not permit a good faith purchaser to acquire title to stolen 
property, Swiss law does, and Swiss law governed the drawing’s title.  
The court denied a motion to reconsider on June 18, 2008.261 
After a trial on the merits, the court found that Bakalar’s title traces 
back to a sale by Fritz Grunbaum’s sister-in-law, whom the court 
found received the painting as a gift from Elisabeth, then sold it to 
Kornfeld.262  Although adopted as factual truth by the trial court, 
Kornfeld’s testimony and the evidence of the 1956 sale have been 
questioned by an expert hired by the Grunbaum heirs.263  Moreover, 
under the court’s theory, the power of attorney signed by Fritz 
Grunbaum in Dachau must have given Elisabeth the power to make a 
valid gift of the painting to his sister-in-law in Nazi Vienna—after 
Fritz died intestate and shortly before Elisabeth was shipped off to her 
death. 
As described below, there simply was no justification for applying 
Swiss law in any aspect of the case when the art simply passed 
through Switzerland for a few months.264  As to whether title could 
have transferred from someone in Austria, Austrian law controls.  As 
to a bona fide purchaser defense and the limitations periods, New 
York law controls because of its interest in preventing the transfer of 
stolen property within its boundaries.  Under any other analysis, this 
case would set a precedent that title might have vested in an object 
under foreign law and then, because of time spent in New York, 
effectively divested.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit should clarify conflicts analysis for the benefit of claimants to 
and innocent purchasers of stolen art so that they may better evaluate 
the merits of claims and reach settlement without litigation. 
 
260 Bakalar v. Vavra, No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP), 2006 WL 2311113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2006). 
261 Bakalar v. Vavra, 550 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
262 Bakalar, 2008 WL 4067335, at *2. 
263 See Supplemental Expert Opinion, Bakalar v. Vavra, 2008 WL 4067335 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 2, 2008) (No. 05 Civ. 3037(WHP)) (admitted into the Record by the Second Circuit 
in March 2009) (on file with author). 
264 See infra Part VII.A. 
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VII 
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 
If the judges deciding the new U.S. cases allow them to move 
beyond the statute of limitations and laches phases,265 these cases 
may lay further precedent for resolving future claims to art displaced 
during the Nazi era and clarify the line between forced and voluntary 
sales in the context of Nazi persecution.  Below is a discussion of the 
key issues that remain unresolved. 
A.  Proper Choice-of-Law Analysis266 
A federal court must apply the choice-of-law (conflicts) principles 
of the state in which it sits to determine applicable substantive law.267  
A conflicts analysis is necessary only where there is a “true conflict,” 
a meaningful difference in the potentially applicable laws of different 
jurisdictions.268  Different law often controls different issues.269 
For example, in cases of intestate succession, New York’s Estates, 
Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) section 3-5.1(b)(2) governs choice of 
law for issues such as donative intent, undue influence, order of 
succession, revocatory effect of conduct of a testator, and the scope, 
effect, and validity of powers of appointment: 
(b) Subject to the other provisions of this section: . . . (2) The 
intrinsic validity, effect, revocation or alteration of a testamentary 
disposition of personal property, and the manner in which such 
property devolves when not disposed of by will, are determined by 
 
265 In its statute of limitations and laches analyses, the court deciding Toledo Museum of 
Art v. Ullin found that widely reported events in 1998 factor into whether the claimant was 
put on notice of the need to search for lost art.  477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807–08 (N.D. Ohio 
2006). 
266 Significant portions of this section reproduce the author’s work in the Brief for 
Bernard Beliak et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Counter-Claimant-
Appellants, supra note 45. 
267 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
268 Md. Cas. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 332 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2003). 
269 E.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 88–94 
(2d Cir. 1998) (carefully applying separate choice-of-law analyses to copyright ownership, 
infringement, and remedies); see also Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., Index No. 115143/99, 
2001 WL 1117493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 2001) (“In deciding which state has the 
prevailing interest, a court uses only those facts [and/or] contacts which relate to the 
purpose of the particular law in conflict. . . . Under this approach, the significant contacts 
are, almost exclusively, the parties’ domicile and the locus of the tort.” (citation omitted)). 
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the law of the jurisdiction in which the decedent was domiciled at 
death.270 
The statute appears to be easily overlooked in litigation that 
tangentially raises probate issues but occurs outside of probate 
court.271  For example, in Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence,272 the 
New York Court of Appeals refused to reach the merits of an appeal 
concerning heirs’ personal property claims because the parties, the 
Special Term of the New York Supreme Court, and the Appellate 
Division all assumed the substantive law of New York applied, and 
“[i]n doing so, all ha[d] overlooked the applicable choice of law 
principle . . . that questions concerning personal property rights are to 
be determined by reference to the substantive law of the decedent’s 
domicile.”273 
Where there is a choice-of-law statute, there is no need to engage 
in a conflicts analysis.274  No Nazi-era art case to date has applied 
New York’s EPTL section 3-5.1(b)(2) or any of the choice-of-law 
statutes of other states, but not every stolen art case has involved 
tangential estate-type issues.275  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Bakalar is being asked to consider applying EPTL section 3-
51(b)(2) to the questions of whether Mr. Fritz’s art collection was part 
 
270 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1 (McKinney Supp. 2009).  In the absence 
of an applicable statute, some of these issues could be seen as contractual, which would be 
governed by common law interest analysis as discussed below.  See Keoseian v. von 
Kaulbach, 763 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 956 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that Germany’s strong interest in protecting its citizens who allegedly made 
gratuitous promises required applying common law). 
271 Perhaps the oversight occurs because courts are not accustomed to choice-of-law 
statutes.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. b (1971) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“[A] court will rarely be directed by statute to apply the local 
law of one state, rather than the local law of another state, in the decision of a particular 
issue[.]”). 
272 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985). 
273 Id. at 745 (citations omitted); see also De Werthein v. Gotlib, 594 N.Y.S.2d 230 
(App. Div. 1993); cf. Grosshandels-Und Lagerei-Berufsgenossenschaft v. World Trade 
Ctr. Props., LLC, 435 F.3d 136, 140 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006) (implicitly criticizing an earlier 
case for failing to undertake conflict-of-laws analysis and “void[ing] by judicial fiat the 
legislative choices of New York” in failing to apply other EPTL provisions); Schoeps v. 
Andrew Lloyd Webber Art Found., No. 116768/06, 2007 WL 4098215, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 19, 2007) (citing Grosshandels with approval); RESTATEMENT, supra note 271,  
§ 6 cmt. i (noting desire of “[u]niformity of result . . . when the transfer of an aggregate of 
movables, situated in two or more states, is involved”). 
274 RESTATEMENT, supra note 271, § 6(1). 
275 See, e.g., Rep. of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(dealing with claims by Turkey to artifacts allegedly dug up illegally and smuggled out of 
country). 
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of his estate and whether anyone could have legally transferred 
property out of his estate.  If it applies Austrian law, presumably 
including the 1946 Nullification Act, the court would likely invalidate 
Mr. Bakalar’s title. 
Where no conflicts statute is on point, most states, including New 
York, conduct an interest analysis in tort cases “under which the law 
of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation is 
applied.”276  The leading conflicts case in the stolen art conversion 
context is Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.277  Both the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Southern District of Indiana District Court 
appear to have entirely ignored the possibility that Cypriot law should 
apply, which actually would have been the most appropriate choice 
given that the artwork was stolen from and had the greatest 
connection to Cyprus.  Instead, they applied a choice-of-law analysis 
based solely on the jurisdictional contacts of Indiana and Switzerland, 
which resulted in the determination that Indiana law applied.278  The 
court reached the right result—restitution to Cyprus of stolen art 
attempted to be “cleaned” in a shady quick-sale in Switzerland—but 
based on faulty reasoning.279  It is actually not uncommon in stolen 
art cases for the courts to either avoid conflicts analysis by stating that 
no true conflict exists, such as in Autocephalous, or to perform a 
conflicts analysis without full analysis of the options.280 
 
276 Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998); accord RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 271, § 145 (Torts General Principle); id. § 147 (Wrongs: Injuries to Tangible Things); 
id. § 147 cmt. b (conversion).  Courts and scholars often utilize incorrect Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws provisions, seemingly interchanging §§ 145, 147 cmt. b, 244 
(voluntary conveyance), 246 (Property: Acquisition by Adverse Possession or Prescription 
of Interest in Chattel), and 221 (Contracts: Restitution).  See id. § 5 (stating conflicts rules 
“are as open to reexamination as any other common law rules” in accordance with 
applicable policy considerations); id. § 5 cmt. c (stating that “more drastic changes have 
recently been made in the common law rules of Conflict of Laws than in most other areas 
of the law, and it seems probable that this trend will continue”). 
277 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). 
278 Id. at 287. 
279 Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen 
Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1177, 1182 (2005). 
280 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 879 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J., dissenting) 
(“The majority simply sidesteps the question of which state’s tort law ought to be applied 
to this case.”); Gemological Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Zarian Co., No. 03 Civ. 4119(RLE), 2006 
WL 2239594, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (avoiding conflict issue by holding that, even 
if the purchase occurred abroad, the party with the burden did not demonstrate that the 
purchase met the conditions of Israeli law to obtain title). 
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In contrast, other courts have erred by relying on the following 
quote from Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, which raised 
arguments equivalent to an adverse possession or prescription case 
and relied on Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 246: 
“[Q]uestions relating to the validity of a transfer of personal property 
are governed by the law of the state where the property is located at 
the time of the alleged transfer.”281  When a painting has changed 
hands multiple times, with an original involuntary dispossession 
followed by voluntary transactions, it can be unclear to a court which 
transfer is relevant when determining choice of law.  Indeed, the 
Kunstsammlungen court applied New York law under an interest 
analysis to the adverse possession claim282 in order to “best promote . 
. . [New York] policy,”283 even though all of the evidence indicated 
an American G.I. stole a fifteenth-century painting in Germany and 
sold it in Brooklyn in 1946—where it remained until its location was 
discovered by the claimant in 1966.284  Kunstsammlungen, like 
Autocephalous, reached the right result, restitution of clearly stolen 
property to a claimant actively searching for it, but for the wrong 
reasons.  It should have reached the result not by applying the law of 
New York, in which good title cannot be obtained from a thief, but 
rather by applying the law of Germany, where the fifteenth-century 
painting was stolen; in which case, it would have then had to 
determine whether the possession: (1) fell within the scope of the 
German adverse possession law, (2) met the German legal 
requirements of good faith, and (3) was continuous for the German 
statutory period. 
Under any other analysis, title might have vested in an object under 
foreign law and then, because of time spent in New York, effectively 
divested.  In the typical looted art case, the art simply passed through 
Switzerland, and, despite the common assumption in relevant 
literature,285 there is simply no reason why Swiss law should control.  
A contrary analysis could have devastating effects upon the stability 
of the art market, particularly in New York. 
 
281 536 F. Supp. 829, 845–46 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
282 Id. at 846. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 830–32. 
285 E.g., Kunitz, supra note 67, at 525 (noting that “items are smuggled into 
Switzerland, and it is at that point that Swiss law becomes an issue”). 
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B.  Limitations Period, Laches, and Burdens of Proof 
As to limitations periods, local law controls.  First, as the Bakalar 
lower court correctly pointed out in its May 30, 2008, opinion, both 
the New York limitations periods and laches principle apply without 
any need for conflicts analysis.286  Nonetheless, all of the New York 
stolen art conversion cases cited by the lower court performed 
conflicts analysis on precisely these issues.  Warin v. Wildenstein & 
Co.287 relied on Kunstsammlungen and noted that the law of the state 
where the injury occurred governs the dispute, except in 
“extraordinary circumstances.”288  Then, despite the fact that 
possession cannot be wrongful and, thus, trigger an injury until 
demand and refusal,289 which in Warin occurred in New York after 
an attempted auction, the Warin court applied French law.290  The 
court specifically noted that the claim would have been barred under 
either New York or French law; thus, there was no true conflict.291  
Similarly, the claim in Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. 
Christie’s, Inc. (Greek Orthodox),292 was extremely weak, and the 
court claimed to apply a foreign limitations period while noting that 
“the laches defense provides a basis for granting defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment whether French law or New York law 
applies.”293  In sum, Warin and Greek Orthodox are being relied on 
 
286 Bakalar v. Vavra, 550 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
287 No. 115143/99, 2001 WL 1117493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 2001). 
288 Id. 
289 See Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A conversion does 
not occur when there is only a taking of property from its rightful owner.  A conversion 
occurs when someone exercises dominion over the property without the owner’s consent 
or authority.”); Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964), modified on other 
grounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification rev’d, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 
1969) (“[A] demand by the rightful owner is a substantive, rather than a procedural, 
prerequisite to the bringing of an action for conversion by the owner . . . [and] the statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until demand and refusal.”). 
290 Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., 746 N.Y.S.2d 282, 282 (App. Div. 2002). 
291 See id. at 282–83.  After issuing its initial opinion affirming the lower court, the 
Appellate Division, First Department, issued a new opinion specifically noting that 
“contrary to the court’s holding, the defense of laches is available to defendants.”  Id. at 
283. 
292 No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 WL 673347 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999). 
293 Id. at *3.  Moreover, Greek Orthodox was an adverse possession and prescription 
case relying on Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 246, not a conversion 
case like Bakalar, which correlates to section 147, comment b.  Even Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws section 191 (Contract to Sell Interest in Chattel), which 
controls in disputes between the contracting parties, has a “most significant relationship” 
carve-out. 
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for their conflicts analysis, which is questionable dicta.  In claims 
arising in New York,294 foreign law cannot preempt New York’s 
laches principles or the three-year limitations period triggered by a 
demand and refusal.295 
Second, the burden of proof lying with the possessor of allegedly 
stolen property when trying to prove title is as essential a part of New 
York law as is demand and refusal.296  As stated in another New York 
case: “We recognize this burden to be an onerous one, but it well 
serves to give effect to the principle that ‘[p]ersons deal with the 
property in chattels or exercise acts of ownership over them at their 
peril.’”297 
C.  Factual Evidence of Involuntariness 
Holding, more than sixty years after the war, that all sales by Jews 
in Nazi territory will be presumed involuntary as a matter of law 
could lay the groundwork for an influx of claims that would otherwise 
lack merit.  Consider the weight that such a presumption would give 
to plaintiffs, encouraging, for example, not only trivial claims, but 
also claims for items that simply lack sufficient documentation as to 
their sale.  In short, such a solution risks shifting the balance of justice 
excessively toward claimants—to the point of doing injustice to 
 
294 Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 722 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that 
because the contested property “is located in New York, any claim to it accrues in New 
York, and its statute of limitations applies” but implying that the injury arose at the place 
of initial improper taking of the property). 
295 See also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 846 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that German Ersitzung commercial certainty policy “does not 
extend to transactions which take place beyond its borders”); Interested Lloyd’s 
Underwriters v. Ross, No. 04 Civ. 4381(RWS), 2005 WL 2840330 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
2005) (applying New York law in voluntary entrustment scenario, even though contract 
stated title passed upon payment and the painting was shipped from Japan to New York 
after payment). 
296 See, e.g., Lobel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1951); In re 
Moffett's Estate, 266 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991–92 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding that the law never 
presumes a gift).  The final issue relevant to conflicts analysis in this case, is, as logic 
suggests, the predicate issue that the elements of conversion must be determined under 
local law before the relevant issue for a conflicts analysis can even be identified.  
RESTATEMENT, supra note 271, §§ 7–8.  “Conversion is the ‘unauthorized assumption and 
exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the 
owner’s rights.’”  Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth., 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (N.Y. 
1995) (citations omitted). 
297 Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (App. Div. 1990) 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 
93 (5th ed. 1984)) (alteration in source). 
 84 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 37 
possessors.  A more modest legal theory, such as implementing a 
presumption of forced sale as to transfers of items at prices 
significantly below fair market value—after the Nazi takeover of the 
territory where the particular sale was made—would be more 
justifiable. 
Additionally, before sending a demand letter to a possessor of 
seemingly stolen art, claimants need to perform extensive art history 
research, often in many different archives in different countries and in 
various databases, to build a strong case.  This needs to be done 
promptly after the claimants have an indication that they may have a 
claim so as to avoid a statute of limitations or laches defense.  
Present-day possessors will not give up valuable art easily.  In 1998, it 
was hoped that museums would readily forfeit art in the face of valid 
claims, but the new declaratory judgment movement indicates that the 
museums must be convinced by very solid factual evidence—of theft, 
lack of post-war restitution, and, perhaps, lack of statute of limitations 
and laches defenses—before giving up art.  “Claimant Beware” is a 
good mantra for claimants contemplating sending demand letters to 
present-day possessors before having all of the expensive art history 
research, analyzing the likely outcome of a choice-of-law analysis, 
and fully understanding potentially applicable foreign law, which will 
require foreign experts and be expensive. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, any precedent set by the currently pending cases 
most likely would not favor claimants of flight assets sold at close to 
fair market value when there is no evidence of either looting or a 
direct link between the sale of the specific asset and a specific Nazi 
decree compelling its Aryanization or auction—although Schoeps II 
suggests that at least summary judgment can be avoided with the 
presentation of sufficient factual evidence to question the motivation 
behind the sale.298  However, courts should look more closely to 
 
298 Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“While the record regarding the transfers of these Paintings is meagre [sic], it is informed 
by the historical circumstances of Nazi economic pressures brought to bear on ‘Jewish’ 
persons and property . . . and . . . the Court concludes that Claimants have adduced 
competent evidence sufficient to create triable issues of fact as to whether they have 
satisfied the elements of a claim. . . . For example, Claimants have adduced competent 
evidence that Paul never intended to transfer any of his paintings and that he was forced to 
transfer them only because of threats and economic pressures by the Nazi government.  
Summary judgment is therefore not appropriate.”). 
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determine whether seemingly voluntary transfers were in fact forced 
sales engineered to look voluntary, to which Military Government 
Law 59 in Germany and the 1946 Nullification Act in Austria called 
attention immediately after the war.299  Whether the court also shifts 
the burden of proof when the evidence points to the possibility of 
such a sale will be a key factor in its outcome. 
During the March 2, 2009, meeting at the U.S. State Department, it 
was suggested that a statute be drafted to unify choice-of-law analysis 
at the federal level for all art cases (meaning Nazi-era cases, 
antiquities cases, and other art conversion-type cases).  One item on 
the agenda that was not discussed was the possibility of creating a 
domestic or bilateral commission, and this idea has since gained 
steam.300  In the perhaps utopian hope of ending the litigation and 
achieving justice, a compromise legislative proposal is attached to this 
Article as the Appendix.  It is offered in the spirit that some of the 
tools outlined therein might be helpful to reaching a more 
comprehensive solution to Nazi-era art claims.301 
 
299 The facts in one recent case, Vineberg v. Bissonnette, which was recently affirmed 
on appeal, involved such a clear-cut forced sale at an infamous “Jew auction” now 
universally recognized as illegal that the court found it easy enough to grant summary 
judgment for the plaintiff, a relatively rare occurrence in U.S. courts.  529 F. Supp. 2d 300 
(D.R.I. 2007) aff’d, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008). 
300 See, e.g., Eizenstat, supra note 8. 
301 See generally Kreder, Tribunal, supra note 9 (proposing parameters for an 
international tribunal to resolve Nazi-era art claims). 
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APPENDIX 
Initial Draft for Discussion Purposes 
An Act 
To amend Titles 22 and 26, United States Code, to resolve claims 
to personal property displaced during the Nazi era and improve 
foreign relations, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1.  SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Nazi-Era Art Restitution Act of 
2009” or the “NEAR Act.” 
SECTION 2.  NAZI-ERA ART RESTITUTION. 
Section 165 of Title 26, United States Code, shall be amended as 
follows: 
XXX 
A new Chapter 89 entitled Nazi-Era Art Restitution shall be added 
to Title 22, United States Code, as follows: 
XXX 
A new Chapter X entitled Nazi-Era Claims Commission shall be 
added to Title 28, United States Code, as follows: 
XXX 
SECTION 3.  PURPOSE. 
The purpose of the Nazi-Era Art Restitution Act (Act or this Act) is 
to insure that the interstate commerce in art does not unwittingly 
capitalize on the horrors suffered during the Nazi era, to more fully 
implement the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art, and to take advantage of tax incentives to avoid 
victimization of good faith purchasers of art displaced during the Nazi 
era who reasonably believed that they possessed good title. 
SECTION 4.  SCOPE. 
This Act applies to claims to personal property alleged to have 
been forcibly displaced during the Nazi era and never previously 
restituted to the claimant or the claimant’s predecessor. 
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SECTION 5.  FINDINGS. 
[To be added.] 
SECTION 6.  DEFINITIONS. 
Aryanization: Aryanization is: (1) a process whereby owners of 
property transferred the property to an individual not considered to be 
an inferior human according to Nazi doctrine (an Aryan) in an attempt 
to insulate it from loss, pursuant to Nazi decree, or (2) the transfer of 
property from non-Aryans to Aryans pursuant to Nazi decree. 
Blocked Account: A Blocked Account is one that was established in 
the name of a person during the Nazi era but from which no 
withdrawals were permitted. 
Burdens of Proof: The Burdens of Proof under this Act shall be by 
the preponderance of the evidence unless otherwise noted. 
Claimant: A Claimant is one asserting the right to exercise 
dominion and control over personal property, presently held by a 
Present-Day Possessor, pursuant to this Act. 
Fair Market Value: Fair Market Value (FMV) is a price paid that is 
equivalent to 75% of the highest price paid for a similar object by the 
same artist in a European market during the time period of 1930–
1931.  Where there is a disparity in price in different European cities 
or at different times, the higher price controls. 
Flight Taxes: Flight Taxes include all discriminatory taxes, fees, 
and assessments imposed by the Nazi regime on individuals for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, ideology, or political opposition 
to Nazi ideology, the most commonly known of which are those 
taxes, fees, and assessments imposed on Jews fleeing occupied 
territory.  Reasons of nationality shall not include measures which, 
under recognized rules of international law, are usually permissible 
against property of nationals and enemy countries. 
Good Faith Purchaser: A Good Faith Purchaser is one who, under 
the circumstances of a purchase of personal property, would not have 
reasonably suspected that the personal property had a reasonable 
chance of having been looted or subjected to a forced sale during the 
Nazi era. 
Looted Personal Property (and Looted): Looted Personal Property 
is personal property that, during the Nazi era, was (1) taken from its 
owner pursuant to Nazi decree, (2) purchased and the compensation 
for which was paid into a Blocked Account, (3) sold to pay Flight 
Taxes, or (4) otherwise stolen or taken by larceny, robbery, theft, 
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threat, or duress.  General economic pressure resulting from World 
War II does not constitute duress if it is not a consequence of 
discrimination for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ideology, or 
political opposition to Nazi ideology.  Reasons of nationality shall not 
include measures which, under recognized rules of international law, 
are usually permissible against property of nationals and enemy 
countries. 
Looted Personal Property Inventory: A Looted Personal Property 
Inventory is a widely known inventory of looted personal property in 
existence prior to the Present Day Possessor’s purchase, such as 
Repertoire des Biens Spolies en France Durant la Guerre 1939–1945 
(List of Property Removed from France During the War 1939–1945). 
Nazi Decree: A Nazi Decree is: (1) a law, regulation, or order 
authorizing the Aryanization or other taking of personal property; (2) 
auctions held to sell Jewish property taken during the Nazi era; or (3) 
the taking of property by a member of the Nazi party. 
Nazi Era: The Nazi Era is the period of time between January 30, 
1933, and May 8, 1945, during which the Nazi Party ruled Germany, 
or the period of time, ending on May 8, 1945, after the date a country 
was annexed, occupied, or invaded by Germany, as indicated below: 
Federal Republic of Germany  1/30/33 
Republic of Austria  3/13/38 
Czechoslovakia  10/15/38 
Republic of Poland  9/1/39 
Norway  4/9/40 
Denmark  4/9/40 
French Republic  5/10/40 
Belgium  5/10/40 
Luxembourg  5/10/40 
The Netherlands  5/10/40 
Romania  10/7/40 
Yugoslavia  4/6/41 
Greece  4/5/41 
Nazi Party Member: A Nazi Party Member is a person who was 
registered with the National Socialist German Workers’ Party during 
the Nazi era. 
Personal Property: Personal Property is any moveable or tangible 
thing not including land and anything growing on or permanently 
affixed to it. 
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Present-Day Possessor: A Present-Day Possessor is one who 
exercises dominion and control over personal property that is subject 
to a claim pursuant to this Act. 
Red List: The Red List is the Final Report of the U.S. Office of 
Strategic Services Art Investigation Unit issued on May 1, 1946, 
listing individuals believed to have trafficked in Nazi-looted art.  It is 
available at http://docproj.loyola.edu/oss1/toc.html. 
SECTION 7.  CLAIMANTS’ STANDING—HEIGHTENED 
PLEADING. 
(a) A Claimant must allege in the Complaint standing to pursue a 
claim to the personal property at issue because it belonged to the 
Claimant prior to being looted or belongs to the Claimant now by 
virtue of some other legal right, such as contract, heirship, or 
inheritance.  The law of the state in which the federal court sits, 
including any applicable provision to apply foreign law, shall control 
all issues concerning the capacity of the Claimant to represent an 
estate. 
(b) A Claimant must file an affidavit or verified certificate with 
the first pleading waiving any domestic or foreign privacy or 
confidentiality laws that may prevent discovery of information related 
to the claim. 
SECTION 8.  HEIGHTENED DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS. 
(a) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply to discovery 
in such cases except as follows. 
(b) It is essential to provide the Claimant with early access to 
information uniquely in the possession of the Present-Day Possessor.  
The initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure normally require a party to produce only that 
information that would “support its claims or defenses, unless that use 
would be solely for impeachment.”  In regard to claims under this 
Act, the Present-Day Possessor must produce all information 
possessed as of the date on which initial disclosures are due that is 
“relevant to” any party’s claims or defenses, as that term is used in 
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The duty to 
supplement initial disclosures contained in Rule 26(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure also applies. 
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(c) The court shall inform itself of any potentially applicable 
foreign law by making liberal use of the sources cited in Rule 44.1 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) The court shall liberally grant subpoenas pursuant to Rule 45 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain discovery from third 
parties. 
SECTION 9.  CLAIM. 
A rebuttable presumption that the property was looted and never 
restituted shall be established if (1) the Claimant has made a prima 
facie showing that the personal property was Looted Property or (2) 
the Claimant, or the Claimant’s predecessor in interest, made a claim 
for the personal property after 1945 that was honored by a domestic 
or foreign court or tribunal without acting as a bar to later restitution.  
Eye-witness testimony, photographs, and receipts demonstrating 
ownership often will be sufficient to satisfy this burden. 
SECTION 10.  GOOD FAITH PURCHASER PROTECTION. 
(a) Only if the Claimant satisfied the burden under Section 9, shall 
the burden shift to the Present-Day Possessor to show both that the 
Present-Day Possessor was a Good Faith Purchaser and possession of 
valid title pursuant to the law of the state in which the personal 
property was allegedly looted, including any applicable post-war laws 
designed to unwind certain Nazi-era transactions, except that any law 
providing that title would have vested pursuant to the doctrines of 
limitations, repose, or prescription shall not apply. 
(b) One may not qualify as a Good Faith Purchaser if the personal 
property was listed in a looted personal property inventory prior to the 
date of purchase.  One may not qualify as a Good Faith Purchaser if 
the personal property was purchased by the Present-Day Possessor or 
his agent from a dealer listed on the Red List. 
(c) If the Present-Day Possessor fails to meet his burden under this 
Section 10, the Claimant shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees 
and costs in pursuing its claim under this Act. 
SECTION 11.  TAXATION. 
(a) No recovery, restitution, judgment, or other compensation 
awarded under this Act shall be subject to federal or state taxation. 
(b) The Present-Day Possessor who has met the burden under 
Section 10 shall be entitled to take a loss on the individual’s federal 
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taxes in accordance with Internal Revenue Code § 165 in the amount 
equivalent to the Fair Market Value of the personal property on the 
date of final judgment in that year, or rolled over to future years, in 
accordance with Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, §§ 1211 and 1231. 
SECTION 12.  SETTLEMENT. 
If the Claimant and Present-Day Possessor reach a settlement, the 
appropriate U.S. District Court shall hold a hearing to determine 
whether: (1) the Claimant has made a prima facie showing that the 
personal property was looted and never restituted and (2) the Present-
Day Possessor has made a prima facie showing of being a Good Faith 
Purchaser of the personal property.  If the appropriate U.S. District 
Court determines that both parties have made the requisite prima facie 
showings, it shall enter an Order so stating, and the tax treatment of 
Section 11 of this Act shall apply to the settlement. 
SECTION 13.  MANDATORY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
[VIA THE COMMISSION]. 
[This language is typical mandatory mediation language, but would 
need to be altered to parallel the commission’s process: 
(a) Unless the court finds that mediation would not be beneficial, 
within thirty days of the making of the parties’ initial disclosures 
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court shall order the parties to engage in mediation at the earliest 
possible date. 
(b) Within thirty days of the court ordering mediation, the parties 
may choose a mediator to conduct a settlement conference.  If the 
parties choose a mediator, the parties shall notify the court of the 
name of the individual.  If the parties do not notify the court that they 
have chosen a mediator, the court shall assign a mediator to conduct a 
settlement conference.  Within seven days after the parties are 
notified of the identity of the mediator, a party may object in writing 
to the selection, stating the reasons for the objection.  If the court 
sustains the objection, the court shall appoint a different mediator. 
(c) The mediator shall schedule an initial conference with the 
parties as soon as practicable.  At least fifteen days before the initial 
conference, the parties shall send a brief written outline of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the party’s case to the mediator.  If the 
mediator finds that the parties need to engage in discovery for a 
limited period of time in order to facilitate the alternative dispute 
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resolution, the mediator may mediate the scope and schedule of 
discovery needed to proceed with the alternative dispute resolution, 
adjourn the initial conference, and reschedule an additional 
conference for a later date.  The outline described in this subsection 
and any written or oral communication made in the course of a 
conference under this section: (1) are confidential, (2) do not 
constitute an admission, and (3) are not discoverable. 
(d) Unless excused by the mediator, the parties shall appear at all 
conferences held under this section.  A party who fails to comply with 
the provisions of this section is subject to the sanctions provided in 
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, the costs of alternative dispute resolution shall 
be divided equally between the parties.] 
SECTION 14.  PROVENANCE RESEARCH. 
The sum of $X is hereby allocated for provenance research to be 
distributed in the following manner: [method of distribution to 
museums].  Priority is to be given to personal property most likely to 
be claimed under this Act. 
SECTION 15.  EDUCATION. 
The sum of $X is hereby allocated for education through the 
Federal Judicial Center so that federal judges may better understand 
the historical context of Nazi-era claims and the legal issues 
implicated by them. 
SECTION 16.  JURISDICTION AND PREEMPTION. 
(a) U.S. District Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all 
claims filed after the effective date of this Act arising out of a transfer 
of personal property during the Nazi era, be they asserted as claims, 
counterclaims, cross claims, impleader actions, or interpleader 
actions. 
(b) This Act shall preempt all state law concerning title or 
possession of personal property allegedly displaced during the Nazi 
era, including claims for conversion, replevin, trover, trespass to 
chattels, restitution, and declaratory relief. 
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SECTION 17.  MISCELLANEOUS. 
(a) In cases filed by the Present-Day Possessor as a plaintiff 
seeking declaratory judgment as to title under this Act, the burdens of 
proof stated above shall nonetheless apply. 
(b) In cases filed by the Present-Day Possessor for declaratory 
judgment as to title under this Act, the Claimant shall be deemed a 
“defendant” for purposes of applying the removal provisions 
contained in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United 
States Code. 
(c) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure referenced throughout 
this Act are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial 
Procedure, of the United States Code. 
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